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LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTION OF CREDITOR 
POWERS AND REMEDIES: A CASE STUDY 
OF THE NEGOTIATION AND DRAFTING 
OF THE WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT 
Jeffrey Davis* 
W ITH the vast growth of consumer credit in the United States, followed by the growth of sympathy for the consumer, it 
became increasingly clear in the mid-1960's that the time for com-
prehensive consumer credit legislation was near. To encourage the 
passage of uniform legislation, the National Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws established the Special Committee on Retail Install-
ment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury to draft the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (DCCC). Although some prelim-
inary work had already been done, serious efforts began in 1965. 
The UCCC went through eight preliminary drafts, and comments 
were sought from all sectors of the consumer-credit community.1 The 
ninth and final draft was approved in 1968 and, after minor modifi-
cations, was published in 1969.2 
Although the UCCC initially met with consumer approval,3 the 
hoped-for general support was not to be. Criticism began to mount, 
and much of the initial support was withdrawn. The UCCC has been 
criticized for, among other things, having been funded primarily by 
lenders,4 allowing excessively high interest rates,5 and failing to pro-
vide effective private remedies for consumers.6 In general, the criticism 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Dakota. B.S. 1965, UCLA; J.D. 
1972, Loyola University of Los Angeles; LL.M. 1973, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
I. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note, xxi-xxii. 
2. The modifications were to conform with the provisions of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, as amended, Fair Credit Re-
porting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601-81t (1970), 18 u.s.c. §§ 891-96 (1970)). See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 
Prefatory Note, xvii-xix. 
3. Stengel, Should States Adopt the Uniform Consumer Credit Code?, 60 KY. L.J. 8, 
~Q~~ . 
4. Id. at 40; Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 298, 
299-300 (1969). Murphy considers these attacks to have been unfair. 
5. A Consumer Credit Code .•• for Lenders, 34 CONSUMER REPORTS, March 1969, 
at 121, 121-22. The UCCC provides for maximum annual interest rates of 36 per cent 
on small loans and 24 per cent on revolving accounts. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 
§§ 2.201, .207. 
6. Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew 
Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAw. 1039 (1968); James &: Fragomen, Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles V and VI, 57 GEO, L.J. 923 (1969); 
Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272 (1969). 
[3] 
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has centered around an alleged failure to restrict creditor powers 
and practices sufficiently.7 
The most significant anti-UCCC action was taken by the National 
Consumer Law Center.8 Following a conference of some fifty-five 
consumer experts on June 20, 1969, at which the consensus was that 
the UCCC was inadequate and required substantial revision, the 
Center undertook to develop what was, in its view, an adequate 
code.9 With the aid of a grant from the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, it drafted the National Consumer Act (NCA), published in 
1970. 
Unlike the UCCC, the NCA admittedly demonstrated little con-
cern for attracting creditor support.10 It was drafted in six months, 
primarily by a committee consisting solely of avowed consumer 
advocates,11 with apparently little dispute as to what it would con-
tain.12 The published form of the NCA was the first draft to be 
generally distributed and the first draft upon which general comment 
was solicited. Predictably, the NCA extended well beyond the UCCC 
in restricting creditor powers and remedies and in creating consumer 
enforcement tools. It was acclaimed by some as preferable to the 
UCCC,13 but even its supporters admitted that it was often guilty of 
overkill.14 It was, of course, roundly criticized by others.10 Re-
cently, the National Consumer Law Center has published the suc-
cessor to the NCA-the Model Consumer Credit Act (MCCA). 
7, See H. KruPKE, CoNSU!IIBR CREDIT: TEXT-CASES-MATERIALS 58-62 (1970); Harper, 
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 53 (1969); 
Murphy, supra note 4, at 299; Turner, The UCCC: A Credit Code for Business, 60 
KY. L.J. 49 (1971). 
8. The Center was formerly associated with Boston College Law School. Its offices 
are presently located at I Court St., Boston, Mass. 02108. 
9. NATIONAL CoNSU!IIBR Ac:r, Prefatory Note, iii-iv. 
10. In fact, one of the most significant factors contributing to the creation of the 
NCA was the feeling of its proponents that the UCCC draftsmen, concerned with 
political considerations, did little more than draft a codification of existing credit 
practices. NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r, Prefatory Note, iii. See also Willier, The Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code: What Should Legal Services Attorneys Do?, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE 
R.Ev. 33 (1969). 
11. NATIONAL CoNSU!IIBR Acr, Prefatory Note, iv. The special committee consisted 
of representatives of the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, AFL-CIO, 
AFL-UAW, and various legal service organizations. 
12. NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r, Prefatory Note, app. B, at vii. 
13. See Turner, supra note 7; Comment, Consumer Protection Under the UCCC 
and the NGA-A Comparison and Recommendations, 12 Aruz. L. R.Ev. 572 (1970). 
14. See Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the 
Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. R.Ev. 302, 336 (1972); Comment, supra 
note 13, at 581. 
15. See, e.g., Moo, New Consumer Credit Legislation: Which Approach-The UCCC 
or NCA?, 2 URBAN LAw. 439 (1970). 
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While the MCCA often departs from the NCA, its approach to 
consumer-credit problems is substantially the same. 
The battle over consumer-credit reform is now raging in the state 
legislatures.16 Most states have considered or are presently consider-
ing the DCCC for possible enactment. To date, seven have adopted 
it in some form.17 A few legislatures will probably see some form of 
the MCCA in the near future. There is, however, a third consumer-
credit package that deserves serious consideration-the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act (WCA).18 
In contrast to the UCCC and the MCCA, the WCA is an actual 
statute, the product of six intense months of negotiation and drafting. 
The initial version of the WCA had been introduced in the Wiscon-
sin Assembly in early 1971 as Assembly Bill 105719 (Original A.B. 
1057). Its provisions relating to consumer-credit transactions did not 
differ substantially from those of the NCA.20 In its final form, the 
16. The enactment of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-321, 82 Stat. 146, as amended, Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 
§ 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-8lt (1970), 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970)), 
applied pressure to the states to revise their consumer credit laws. Section 123 of the 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1970), allows the Federal Reserve Board to "exempt from the 
requirements of this part [15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-65 (1970)] any class of credit transactions 
within any State if it determines that under the law of that State that class of trans-
actions is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this 
part, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement." See UNIFORM CONSUMER 
CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note, xxii-xxili. 
17. They are Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. 
l CCH CoNSUMER CREDIT Guml!: 1f 4770 (1973). 
18. Wisconsin Consumer Act, ch. 239, [1971] Wis. Laws 3688 (codified at WIS. STAT. 
§§ 421.101-427.105 (1971)). In this Article, these sections of the Wisconsin Statutes will 
be referred to as sections of the Wisconsin Consumer Act. 
The WCA was based on the NCA. However, the substantive changes that resulted 
from negotiation and redrafting are so pervasive that its resemblance to the NCA is at 
best slight. I have no qualms about designating the WCA as a third package. 
Strictly speaking, the WCA is not solely a consumer-credit package. Although most 
of its provisions apply to consumer-credit transactions, it applies as well to sales 
solicited and contracted away from the regular place of business of the merchant. 
Wisconsin Consumer Act §§,423.201-.205. 
19. The bill was introduced by Representative liarout Sanasarian (D-Milwaukee), 
chairman of the Commerce and Consumer Affairs Committee. Sections 1 through 28 
of the bill would have repealed various statutes and made other technical changes 
necessitated by the addition of the consumer-credit law. Section 29 contains the sub• 
stantive provisions and would have created chapters 421 through 427 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, In this Article citations to the original bill will be to the proposed sections 
contained in section 29 (e.g., A.B. 1057, § 421.101). 
20, Original A.B, 1057 differed significantly from the NCA in many provisions other 
than, those dealing with consumer-credit transactions. The NCA's treatment of con• 
sumer-approval transactions was completely revamped. Compare NATIONAL CONSUMER 
Acr §§ 2.501-.505 with A.B. 1057, §§ 423.201-.212. The NCA provisions regarding a 
council of advisors on consumer affairs, administrative procedure, and judicial review 
(sections 6.301-.414) and regarding credit-reporting agencies (sections 8.101-.303) were 
eliminated. 
Regarding consumer-credit transactions, there were only nvo significant differences 
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WCA was over sixty per cent longer than Original A.B. 1057, and 
the majority of its provisions had been substantially redrafted. 
The WCA is unique in that its provisions were arduously negoti-
ated under political circumstances that put the consumer represen-
tatives in a strong bargaining position. In fact, the strength of the 
consumer position in Wisconsin may never be duplicated again. At 
the same time, the bargaining position of Wisconsin creditors was 
not weak, although it was weaker than that in which creditors usu-
ally stand. The vast financial resources of the creditor representa-
tives, especially compared to those of the consumer representatives, 
their political influence, and the consequent need for their support 
were apparent throughout the drafting process. 
Accordingly, the WCA represents a solution in which consumer-
creditor interests are uniquely balanced. It goes further to protect 
consumer interests than any other such legislation in the country; yet 
it eventually won the support of the great majority of creditors 
within the state.21 Certainly, it is not without its flaws, both technical 
and substantive. But equally certainly, it is a significant event in the 
struggle to realign the relationship between creditor and consumer. 
This Article discusses the background, negotiation, and drafting 
of selected WCA restrictions on creditor powers and remedies and 
compares those provisions to the analogous restrictions proposed by 
other reform measures. In addition to the UCCC, the MCCA and 
the WCA, two other major works must be considered in any dis-
cussion of consumer-credit legislation. First is Working Redraft No. 
4 of the UCCC (UCCC Redraft).22 This proposed revision, published 
in December 1972, represents a marked change in the UCCC. Many 
provisions favorable to the consumer have been added, and many of 
the parallel provisions on sales and loans have been consolidated. 
Although it is not an official recommendation, it indicates the cur-
rent thinking of the UCCC Special Committee. Second is the Report 
of the National Commission on Consumer Finance (Commission Re-
between the NCA and A.B. 1057. First, whereas the NCA regulates credit insurance 
(sections 4.101-.304), A.B. 1057 simply prohibited the charge of any fee or premium for 
such insurance (section 422.418). Second, the NCA provisions regulating liability for 
use of credit cards (sections 2.601-.605) were not included irt A.B. 1057, ' 
21. Among the credit groups supporting the Act in its final form were: Wisconsin 
Credit Union League, Wisconsin Bankers' Association, Wisconsin Retail Merchants' 
Association, Wisconsin Installment Bankers' Association, Wisconsin Consumer Finance 
Association, Wisconsin Farm Implement Dealers' Association, and Wisconsin State 
Chamber of Commerce. Crandall, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: Wisconsin Consumer 
Credit Laws Before and After, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 334, 334-35 n.6 (1973). 
22. UNIFOIUII CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (Working Redraft. No. 4, 1972). 
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port).23 The Commission, established by title IV of the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act,24 submitted the report on December 31, 1972, 
after three years of study. 
My objective in this Article is twofold. First, the discussion may 
enable the reader to understand the objectives of the WCA restric-
tions on creditors' rights and remedies and the interests that they are 
likely to affect. Second, by looking closely at the evolution of the 
WCA in the context of specific issues, it may be possible to determine 
whether the WCA can serve as a model for consumer-credit reform 
movements in other states. 
I. THE SURVEY 
Although the advice and recommendations of many groups were 
sought, the primary negotiating and nearly all of the drafting was 
done by representatives of banks,25 retail merchants,26 consumer 
finance companies,27 and consumers.28 To discover the motives be-
hind the negotiated changes, I interviewed these key negotiators. 
It was necessary to focus on selected portions of the Act; because of 
their notoriety and likely impact on the consumer-credit industry, 
the Act's limitations on creditor practices and remedies were the 
focus of the inquiry. In each case, the negotiator was asked to describe 
the chronology of the change, the groups for and against the change, 
the alternatives considered, and the reason for the action taken. To 
ensure accuracy, the negotiators then reviewed and commented upon 
a draft of the Article. Their comments were incorporated into the 
final version. 
II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE NEGOTIATION AND p ASSAGE 
OF THE WCA 
Until 1970, Wisconsin retail merchants assumed that a revolving 
credit sale was not subject to the Wisconsin twelve per cent per year 
usury limitation. Under the age-old time-price doctrine, if the price 
23. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1972) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
24. Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 164, as amended, Act of July 20, 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-344, 84 Stat. 440. 
25. The primary bank negotiator was Lawrence J. Bugge of Milwaukee. 
26. Retail merchants were chiefly represented by John S. Holbrook, Jr., and Boris 
Auerbach. 
27. Consumer finance companies were primarily represented by Edward J. Heiser, 
Jr. For Heiser's analysis of the WCA and a discussion of some of the problems that 
may arise, see Heiser, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: A Critical Analysis, - MARQ. L. 
REV. - (1973). 
28. The unquestioned consumer leader and, for much of the time, the sole con-
sumer negotiator was Thomas D. Crandall of Milwaukee Legal Services. 
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of goods was not to be paid at the time of the purchase, any increase 
in the amount due when paid was not considered a finance charge. 
Rather, it was simply considered to be a natural increase in the pur-
chase price resulting from the delayed payment.20 In October 1970, 
this house of cards collapsed for Wisconsin merchants who offered 
goods for sale on revolving credit. In State v. J.C. Penney Co.,80 the 
Wisconsin supreme court, looking behind the form of revolving 
charge accounts to their substance, found that such accounts do in-
deed amount to a forbearance of money and not a time sale.81 
The decision had a severe impact on all Wisconsin retailers who 
offered open-end credit plans; these were principally the large re• 
tailers.82 The impact was twofold. First, the retailers were forced to 
limit finance charges on open-end accounts to one per cent per 
month. This substantial reduction in income, not coupled with 
a reduction in overhead, was a severe blow, which put the profitability 
of open-end plans in serious doubt. The second and perhaps more 
significant result was that the retailers immediately became poten• 
tially subject to great liability for past violations of the usury limita-
29. See, e.g., Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, 118-19 (1861). 
30. 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970), noted in '71 CoLUM. L. REV. 905 (1971): 
2 CUMB.-SAM. L. REv. 234 (1971); 54 MARQ. L. REV. 223 (1971); 69 MICH. L. REV. 1868 
(1971); 55 MINN. L. REv. 1244 (1971). 
31. Quoting at length from the trial court opinion analyzing the Penney revolving 
charge contract, the court listed the following factors as among those tending to show 
that the agreement is not a traditional time-price sale: (1) The customer may elect to 
pay cash and lower the cost even after service charges have begun; (2) the contract is 
not entered into in connection with a specific sale; (3) the e.;:tension of credit is based 
on the purchaser's ability to pay; (4) the sale of goods is absolute, with creation of a 
debt as consideration therefor; (5) there may be multiple sales with debt to the account 
and also credit for payments; (6) the "service charge" is not fixed and independent of 
the amount owed; (7) the customer is not quoted a time sale price as well as a cash 
price; (8) the "service charge" is not a penalty intended to induce prompt payment; 
and (9) the sales tax is computed on the cash price. 48 Wis. 2d at 144-50, 179 N.W.2d 
at 651-54. 
The South Dakota supreme court came to the same conclusion in Rollinger v. J.C. 
Penney Co., - S.D. -, 192 N.W.2d 699 (1971). See Note, Interest Incognito-Usury 
Statute Applied to Revolving Charge Account Agreement, 34 U. P11T. L. REv. 54 (1972) 
(discussing both Penney cases). A recent Iowa supreme court decision followed 
the Wisconsin court. See State ex rel. Turner v. Younger Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550 
(1973). However, no other state has followed the Wisconsin decision. See Sliger v. 
R.H. Macy &: Co., 59 N.J. 465, 283 A.2d 904 (1971); Maine Merchants Assn. v. 
Campbell, 287 A.2d 430 (Me. 1972); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Williams, -
Ind. App.-, 288 N.E.2d 170 (1972); Kass v. Garfinckel, Brooks Bros., Miller&: Rhoads, 
Inc., 299 A.2d 542 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973). See also Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 31 
N.Y.2d 443, 45'7, 293 N.E.2d 80, 88, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908, 918-19 (1972). 
32. The decision had little impact on small retailers. Those who carried their own 
credit normally made only closed-end credit sales, which were apparently still outside 
the operation of the usury statute. Any open-end credit available from these merchants 
was normally offered through bank credit cards, which had always been subject to 
usury restrictions. 
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tions.83 Litigation under the usury statutes, in addition to being a 
nuisance, would involve large legal costs and, more significantly, 
could produce a continuous stream of unfavorable publicity. One 
solution to these problems lay in the legislature. As of October 1970, 
the large retailers were primarily interested in obtaining passage of 
legislation that would eliminate the retroactive application of usury 
penalties to revolving sales accounts. 
At the same time, Wisconsin banks hoped to obtain an exemption 
from the usury laws for their open-end credit plans. Apparently, be-
cause of the high cost of handling thousands of small drafts, growth 
of bank credit cards in Wisconsin would have been considerably in-
hibited if there had been no increase in the permissible finance 
charge.34 
In early 1971, through the efforts of the large retailers, S.B. 277, 
a bill prohibiting retroactive application of the usury penalties, was 
introduced into the Wisconsin legislature. Similarly, through the 
efforts of the Wisconsin Installment Bankers Association, A.B. 492, a 
bill increasing allowable finance charges on revolving accounts, was 
also introduced. 
Meanwhile, consumer finance companies, long dissatisfied with 
the Wisconsin rate restrictions on licensed loans,35 succeeded, in June 
1971, in obtaining passage of a bill that relaxed these restrictions 
temporarily.30 The increased rates were to remain in effect until 
July 1973, by which time the legislature would presumably have 
considered the matter more thoroughly.37 
The next significant event in the pre-WCA maneuvering occurred 
in October 1971. Nearly two years before, the Wisconsin legislature 
had established an advisory committee to examine the UCCC and 
recommend the changes, if any, that should be made prior to enact-
ment. The committee initially set out to strengthen the UCCC con-
sumer protections; however, a severe split of opinion developed over 
33. Wis. STAT. § 138.06 (1971) provides various remedies and penalties for loans in 
violation of the usury limitations. These may amount to as much as the total principal, 
interest, and charges paid during the two years prior to suit. Wis. STAT. § 138.06(3) 
(1971). 
34. Conversation with Bill Dixon, Vice-President of First Wisconsin National 
Bank, head of the Credit Card Division, February 28, 1973. 
35. Since consumer finance companies borrow most of the money they lend, the 
increases in the prime rate during the 1960's had significantly reduced profit margins. 
Hence, they sought similar increases in the rates chargeable to consumers. 
36. See Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 8, 1971, at 36, col. 1. 
37. Id. Originally, the finance companies succeeded in obtaining passage of a 
permanent rate increase bill in both houses. However, Governor Lucey vetoed the bill, 
and the finance companies were forced to settle for a temporary increase. 
IO Michigan Law Review [Vol, 72:1 
how much strengthening was needed. On October 4, 1971, two 
consumer representatives on the committee walked out in protest 
over the apparent acceptance of the UCCC. They reportedly charged 
that the UCCC was "nearly worthless" from the standpoint of con-
sumer protection and that the other committee members were com-
mitted to "recommending legislation favorable only to creditors. "88 
The nine remaining representatives continued putting the final 
touches on their recommendation. 
Later in October, Governor Patrick J. Lucey, referring spe-
cifically to A.B. 492 and S.B. 277, officially informed the legislature 
that he was opposed to piecemeal consumer legislation and that he 
did not think legislation beneficial to lenders appropriate without 
added statutory protection for the consumer.89 He further advised 
the legislature to take up A.B. 1057. On October 26, the assembly 
began to work on A.B. I 057, but, due to a flood of proposed amend-
ments, consideration of the bill was postponed until the January 
session. 
Thus, at the end of 1971, the retail merchants sought protection 
from retroactive application of the usury penalties, the banks sought 
rate increases for their revolving charge plans ancJ. for their small 
loans, and the consumer finance companies hoped to make the rate 
increases they had obtained in July permanent. However, the Gover-
nor's position made it clear that special interest legislation would be 
unavailable outside the framework of a comprehensive consumer-
credit package. In addition, consumer advocates recognized that the 
passage of protective legislation would require substantial creditor 
support. But the complete breakdown between the consumer repre-
sentatives and other members of the UCCC advisory committee 
showed that the UCCC could not serve as the catalyst. For these rea-
sons, a consumer-creditor coalition, which had begun to materiali~e 
as early as the summer of 1971, slowly took shape in the hope that, 
through negotiation, A.B. 1057 could be molded into a form that 
could be supported by all. 
The negotiations took place in two clearly discernible stages. 
Well before Governor Lucey's official communication to the legisla-
ture, the banks had known of his desire for comprehensive legisla-
tion, his support of A.B. 1057, and his confidence in its proponents. 
Hence, in August 1971, the bank representatives began conferring 
38. Wis. St. J., Oct. 5, 1971, § 2, at 3, col. I. One of the creditor negotiators told 
me that he thinks this was simply a grandstand play intended to generate support for 
A.B. 1057. He also thinks it worked. 
39. Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 8, 1971, at 36, col. 4. 
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with the proponents of A.B. 1057 to see if a compromise was possi-
ble. With the mutual discovery that they could work together, seri-
ous negotiations began in September; representatives of retail 
merchants joined the discussions a few weeks later. The issue of 
third-party creditor immunity became the testing ground for the 
fragile coalition, so the successful resolution of this problem set the 
tone for subsequent negotiations. The first round of negotiations 
ended in December.40 The fruits of the negotiators' labor were as-
sembled, and A.B. 1057, as modified, was distributed throughout the 
credit community. 
The second stage of the negotiations took place in January 1972. 
Although suggestions and arguments were put forth by numerous 
credit groups-credit unions, farm implement dealers, and savings 
and loan associations-and the banks and retailers continued their 
involvement, the primary input at this stage came from consumer 
finance company representatives. 
Notably absent from the negotiations, although their participa-
tion was solicited, were representatives of the large manufacturer-af-
filiated automobile finance companies and the Wisconsin automobile 
dealers. Their unwillingness to join the coalition is easily under-
stood. Since the prevailing interest rates in the Wisconsin automo-
bile credit market were substantially below the statutory limits, the 
automobile interests needed no rate relief. In addition, they were un-
affected by the Penney case. They made their opposition to the WCA 
clear throughout the negotiations, apparently assuming they could 
prevent its passage. This assumption was, of course, incorrect. Al-
though the automobile finance companies and the dealers worked 
hard to defeat the bill41 and did succeed in getting one amendment 
passed,42 the WCA was adopted substantially as submitted. 
The effect of this group's failure to participate in the negotia-
tions is quite a speculative matter. On many critical issues they were 
represented only to the extent that the banks, which also finance 
automobile sales, shared their interests. The banks, however, sought 
gains in other areas and were willing to compromise the interests 
shared ·with the automobile finance group for the sake of other con-
cerns. Throughout the negotiations and the battle in the legislature, 
40. As of December, the bank-retailer-consumer combination was beginning to bog 
down. Having made a number of substantial concessions and having obtained substan-
tial concessions in return, individual negotiators began to lose their ability to persuade. 
Although all issues had not been resolved, it was time to get some new blood into 
the negotiations. 
41. Crandall, supra note 21, at 334-35 n.6. 
42. See text accompanying notes 250-51 infra. 
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passage of the bill was in doubt. The automobile finance companies 
and the automobile dealers could certainly have exacted substantial 
consumer concessions in exchange for their support. What those con-
cessions might have been cannot be known.43 
On the whole, however, the Act represents an extraordinary in-
dividual and collective effort, put forth by people searching for com-
mon ground, while diligently representing often quite divergent in-
terests. In its final form, the WCA had the support of most credit 
organizations and nearly all consumer groups.44 After a difficult bat-
tle in the legislature45 that resulted in only a few substantive changes, 
the Wisconsin Consumer Act was passed and signed into law on 
March 29, 1972. It went into effect on March 1, 1973. 
III. NEGOTIATING THE WCA 
A. The Elimination of Third-Party Creditor Immunity 
The negotiations began with one of the most notorious consumer-
credit issues: the immunity of the third-party creditor from con-
sumer claims or defenses arising out of failures on the part of the re-
tail merchant.46 Often the credit purchase of goods or services is 
financed by an independent creditor rather than by the seller. In 
such instances, if the goods prove to be defective or if the merchant 
fails to honor his warranty, the customer normally remains obligated 
on the debt; the third-party creditor is immune from any claims or 
defenses that the customer may have against the merchant. The con-
sumer's frustration at being forced to make payments on defective 
goods is not difficult to appreciate. 
43. For some guesses as to what some of these concessions might have been, see text 
following note 198 infra. 
44. For a list of the creditors who supported the WCA, see note 21 supra. Consumer 
groups in support of the Act included Wisconsin Consumers' League; Greater Mil• 
waukee Consumers' League; U.A.W., Region IO; Wisconsin State AFL-CIO; National 
Farmers' Organization; Allied Council of Senior Citizens; Milwaukee County Labor 
Council (AFL·CIO); and Madison Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO). Crandall, supra 
note 21, at 334-35 n.6. 
45. The Act was passed overwhelmingly in the Democrat-controlled Assembly but 
was initially defeated in the Republican-controlled Senate. Capital Times (Madison, 
Wis.), March 3, 1972, at 36, col. I. The defeat was attributed primarily to the efforts ' 
of Household Finance Corporation. Id. However, the Senate moved to reconsider the 
bill, and, after a few minor changes, it was passed a week later. Id., March 9, 1972, 
at I, col. 7. 
46. The elimination of this immunity is often referred to as the abolition of the 
holder in due course doctrine, but the doctrine is only partly responsible for the im• 
munity. See Jordan&: Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM, L. REv. 
387, 433-38 (1968); K.ripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented 'View-
point, 68 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 445, 469-73 (1968); Littlefield, supra note 6; Murphy, supra 
note 4, at 315-20. 
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Immunity is achieved in various ways, depending on the type of 
transaction involved. If the lender makes a direct loan to the con-
sumer, there is no contractual tie-up to the merchant from whom 
the goods are eventually purchased. In the absence of a special 
statutory provision immunity is automatic, regardless of the relation-
ship that the lender may have with the merchant.47 Where the loan 
is indirect-that is, where the seller initially extends the credit and 
then sells the paper to the creditor-immunity may result in one of 
two ways. If the customer has signed a negotiable note, the creditor 
simply takes the note as a holder in due course. If there is no nego-
tiable note, the customer's contract is assigned to the creditor. The 
contract invariably contains a clause wherein the customer waives 
all defenses against an assignee. Although their enforceability has 
been successfully attacked in a number of states,48 these waiver-of-
defense clauses are usually enforced, and immunity is achieved.49 
Basically, the argument for restricting the third-party creditor's 
immunity is that the creditor normally has a continuing relationship 
with the merchant and, by buying the merchant's paper, is helping 
47. Widely variant relationships between merchants and direct lenders abound. For 
example, it·is quite common for lender and merchant to enter into a mutually bene-
ficial referral agreement wherein the merchant suggests to the customer that the par-
ticular lender would be likely to finance the purchase. The creditor, of course, would 
prefer to be the only source of credit suggested. However, it is not uncommon for a 
merchant to recommend more than one possible lender. The customer of a highly 
reputable merchant will have no trouble obtaining credit, provided the customer is 
creditworthy. Hence, unless he receives some kind of a commission, the merchant has 
no reason to agree to limit his referrals to one lender. See Kripke, supra note 46, at 471. 
On the other hand, even if a customer is a good credit risk, many lenders are leery of 
making loans for the purchase of goods from a less reputable merchant, because, even 
if there is no legal liability, a dissatisfied customer is troublesome and the lender would 
prefer to avoid such problems. Hence, the less reputable merchant is delighted to find 
a lender who will accept his referrals, and no further consideration is needed to induce 
exclusive referrals. 
There exist, of course, many other kinds of creditor-merchant relationships, among 
them captive finance companies, familial relationships within lender-merchant manage-
ment, and interlocking directorships. Moreover, regardless of any such relationship, it 
is common practice for the lender to make out the loan check directly to the merchant, 
particularly where the lender retains a security interest in the goods purchased. 
Classically, the immunity of direct lenders is not affected by the existence of such 
relationships, regardless of the intimacy of the relationship. As long as the lender is 
not a party to the sale contract, the customer has no claim or defense against him. 
Littlefield, supra note 6, at 292-93 n.76. 
48. See, e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); 
Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958); Unico v. Owen, 
50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 4:05 (1967). 
49. The cases in this area are far from unauimous in either theory or result. In 
1954, the weight of authority favored immunity. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine oj 
Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1096 (1954). At that time Professor Gilmore 
saw a trend toward elimination of immunity. However, this trend was not so apparent 
to Professor Kripke, writing more recently. See Kripke, supra note 4:6, at 4:69. 
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the merchant to stay in business. 50 When the merchant sells defec-
tive goods or fails to perform his contractual obligations, the credi-
tor is, in a sense, an accomplice and should share the responsibility. 
There was apparently never any question among the first-stage 
negotiators of the WCA that the completed bill would provide for 
some third-party liability. All parties agreed that consumers had been 
unfairly treated in some cases. Moreover, creditors had agreed to 
limited liability in the legislative advisory committee negotiations 
over the UCCC,51 and the banks did not intend to try to regain what 
they had given up there. Indeed, all parties agreed to some extent 
that the doctrine's time had run out. The problem was to define mu-
tually satisfactory limits to the newly created liability. 
Original AB. 1057 sought to eliminate creditor immunity in con-
sumer transactions through three separate provisions, which (1) pro-
hibited the taking of a negotiable instrument and subjected any 
holder of a negotiable instrument to the claims and defenses of the 
debtor to the extent of the transaction total;52 (2) subjected an as-
signee, any waiver clause notwithstanding, to customer claims and 
defenses to the extent of the transaction total;63 and (3) subjected the 
direct lender, to the extent of the amount financed, to all customer 
claims and defenses arising out of an "interlocking loan."64 
The banks' position on immunity was complex. Regulation of 
the financing of retail purchases necessarily affects the retailer, as 
well as the creditor. Often the retailer from whom the bank buys 
consumer paper is also the bank's commercial customer. Thus, in 
order to maintain amiable relationships in the business community, 
the banks were forced to represent the interests of those retail con-
50. Where the credito.r buys the paper free of consumer defenses, the creditor helps 
the disreputable merchant avoid his responsibilities to customers. The nonjudgment-
proof customer is forced to pay, and his only recourse as to the merchant is to bring a 
civil suit-an alternative that rarely appears inviting to consumers. Clearly, it would 
be more difficult for such merchants to stay in business without this assistance, More• 
over, this type of financer is justifiably singled out because other types of financing (for 
example, inventory or accounts receivable financing, or sale of stock) do not offer this 
particular benefit. 
51. The advisory committee had adopted alternative A of UCCC section 2,404, 
wherein an assignee is subject to customer claims and defenses to the extent of the 
amount owing when the claim is raised. However, in addition to the UCCC exception 
of agricultural-purpose transactions from operation of the section, the committee had 
also excepted motor vehicle purchases. Regarding negotiable instruments, the com• 
mittee had adopted UCCC section 2.403, which provides that, except in sales or leases 
for agricultural purposes, the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument 
other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the consumer. 
52. A.B. 1057, § 422.405. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.405. 
53. A.B. 1057, § 422.406. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2,406. 
54. A.B. 1057, § 422.407. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.407. 
November 1973] The Wisconsin Consumer Act 15 
cems that were absent from the negotiations, as well as their own in-
terests. 
Initially, the banks thought three changes were essential. First, 
the complete nullification of waiver-of-defense clauses in credit sales 
was unacceptable.55 The banks were willing, however, to accept a 
delay period during which the assignee-creditor would be subject 
to customer claims and defenses against the merchant, but after 
which waiver clauses would be enforceable. Second, the banks sought 
a narrower definition of interlocking loans, especially with regard to 
credit card transactions. Third, they sought to decrease the amount 
for which a third-party creditor may be liable on an individual 
claim. 
I. Delay Period on Waiver-of-Defense Clauses 
While in some states waiver-of-defense clauses are completely un-
enforceable in certain kinds of contracts, 56 a number of states make 
them unenforceable only for a limited time after the customer has 
been notified of the assignment of his contract.57 Once the delay 
period has passed without the customer having asserted any claim or 
defense, the waiver is enforceable, and creditor immunity results. 
Original AB. 1057 subjected an assignee to customer claims and 
defenses without a time limit;58 the assignee-creditor's liability was 
coextensive with the liability of the merchant. As long as the mer-
chant was legally obligated to the customer, either contractually or 
othenvise, the creditor was potentially liable for any failure to per-
form on the part of the merchant. 
The prospect of indefinite potential liability was very trouble-
55. No Wisconsin creditor was concerned about the prohibition of the use of nego-
tiable instruments in credit sales. While such notes were not completely obsolete in 
Wisconsin, no large national or local retailer used them. 
56. See, e.g., NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 97.275 (1967) (retail installment sales contracts); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-16-5 (Supp. 1971) (retail installment sales contracts); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 69, §§ 615(£)-(g) (1947) (retail installment sales of motor vehicles); WASH. R.Ev. CODE 
ANN. § 63.14.150 (1968) (retail installment sales contracts). 
57. Typically, this delay period is fairly short. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4312 
(Supp. 1970) (15-day notification period for all retail sales); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, 
§ 262D (Supp. 1972) (five-day notification period for all installment sales except motor 
vehicles); MrCH. COMP. LAws. ANN. § 445.865(d) (1967) (15-day notification period for 
all retail installment sales except motor vehicles); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 50-207 to 
-208 (Supp. 1972) (15-day notification period for home improvement retail installment 
sales); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1402 (Supp. 1972) (45-day notification period for all 
retail installment sales except home improvements and motor vehicles); TEX. R.Ev. Crv. 
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.07 to -7.08 (1970) (30-day notification period for all retail 
installment sales). 
58. A.B. 1057, § 422.406. This provision was identical to NATIONAL CONSUMER Acs: 
§ 2.406. The MCCA made no change in this policy. See MoDEL CONSUMER CREDrr Acs: 
§§ 2.601-.602. 
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some to the banks. Although they admitted that the thirty to forty-
five days usually provided by statute69 is too short to protect the cus-
tomer adequately, the banks argued that the economics of financing 
credit sales require some cutoff point beyond which the creditor's 
potential liability is extinguished. It is a common practice among in-
direct lenders to hold a portion of the contract price in a reserve ac-
count as protection against nonpayment. The size of the account is 
normally determined to be a percentage of the total outstanding ac-
counts purchased from the particular dealer. Money is released from 
the account to the dealer periodically, depending on the status of the 
portfolio. It was argued that the increased potential creditor liability 
would require increases in reserves and that the absence of a time 
limit on potential liability would make it impossible to determine 
how to manage these accounts. The result, it was suggested, would 
be increased dealer costs, which would be passed on to the customer. 
Consumer representatives were willing to compromise. However, 
since the banks were not really arguing their own case,00 the con-
sumer representatives drove a hard bargain. Believing that the vast 
majority of legitimate complaints arise within the first year of the 
contract, consumer representatives agreed to delay the effectiveness 
of waiver-of-defense clauses for nvelve months after notice to the 
customer of the assignment.61 They insisted, however, that the delay 
period be so terminated only if the assignee is not "related to"62 the 
59. See note 57 supra. 
60. It was clear that the banks could protect themselves through holdback accounts 
and recourse agreements. Generally, throughout the negotiations, consumer representa• 
tives were not very receptive to arguments made by proxy. Hence, since the primary 
bank concern was protection of the retailer's interest, bank representatives were at 
something of a disadvantage. 
In addition, the validity of the creditors' argument is questionable, If the merchant 
is highly reputable, the number of valid claims wherein the merchant refuses to satls(y 
the customer will be minute, and the impact of liability on the lender will be corre• 
spondingly light. See Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uni• 
form Commercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209, 1215-16 (1950), 
Moreover, the release of funds from a holdback account is actually a matter of 
estimating the probability that an unsatisfied valid claim will arise, Certainly there 
is a point at which this probability with respect to an individual account is sufficiently 
low to permit release of the reserve (for example, when any express warranty runs out), 
Granted, the certainty of a statutory time limit is lacking. But where the creditor 
carries hundreds (or thousands) of accounts with a merchant, the occasional late-arising 
claim is not likely to have a serious economic impact. In my opinion, the banks, rather 
than seeking relief from a severe problem, simply sought the peace of mind that comes 
of certainty. 
61. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422,407 (2), 
62. Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 421.301(32)-(33) define "person related to" as follows: 
(32) "Person related to" with respect to a natural person means: 
(a) The spouse of the natural person; 
(b) A brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law of the natural person; 
(c) An ancestor or lineal descendent of the natural person or his spouse; and 
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assignor and the assignee acquires the contract in good faith and for 
value.63 For the purposes of this section an extremely stringent defi-
nition of good faith, which conceivably could require that the credi-
tor be certain of the merchant's good repute if he is to rely on a 
waiver clause, was included.64 Moreover, while the creditor will not 
be subject to the debtor's claim unless he receives notice of it within 
the twelve-month period, the WCA contains no restrictions as to 
what types of notice will be effective.65 Presumably, any notice of the 
customer's claim, regardless of its source or form, ,\Till be effective 
against the creditor if received in time. This could include informa-
tion received from the merchant, other customers, newspapers, or 
perhaps even the grapevine. It remains for litigation to establish any 
limits. 
With regard to the immunity of the third-party creditor the 
UCCC provides two alternatives.66 Alternative A invalidates waiver-
of-defense clauses entirely, while Alternative B provides for a three-
month delay period. Hence, the DCCC essentially takes no position 
on this issue. The UCCC Redraft, however, discards Alternative B.67 
Similarly, the National Commission on Consumer Finance recom-
mends indeterminate 'lender responsibility. Stating that most delay-
ing statutes provide an "unrealistically short" period within which 
to assert a defense, the Commission concludes that they afford the 
consumer "no real protection."68 
(d) Any other relative, by blood or marriage, of the natural person or his 
spouse who shares the same home with the natural person. 
(33) "Person related to" with respect to an organization means: 
(a) A person directly or indirectly controlling the organization, controlled by 
the organization or, who together with the organization, is under common control; 
(b} An officer or director of the organization or a person performing similar 
functions with respect to the organization or to a person related to the organi-
zation; 
(c) The spouse of a natural person related to the organization; and 
(d) A relative by blood or marriage of a person related to the organization who 
shares the same home with him. 
Section 421.301(31) defines "person" to include both natural persons and organizations. 
A very similar definition of "person related to" is found in MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT 
Acr § 1.433. 
63. Wisconsin Consumer Act§ 422.407(2). 
64. The assignee does not acquire the contract in good faith if he has knowledge or 
written notice of violations of the Act, unconscionable conduct by the assignor, or 
substantial complaints against the assignor involving such contracts. Wisconsin Con-
sumer Act§ 422.407(3). 
65. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.407(2) simply states that a waiver-of-defense 
clause is enforceable only by an assignee who "has not received notice of the customer's 
claim or defense" within 12 months of giving notice of the assignment to the customer. 
66. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404. 
67. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 3.404 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). 
68. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 35. See also Jordan & Warren, supra note 
46, at 434-!15 (discussing the New York ten-day delay statute). 
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Since rp.ost defects in consumer goods should become apparent 
within a year, it cannot be said that the WCA offers "no real protec-
tion." On the other hand, the benefit of the clause to the creditor 
after the delay period seems only marginal.69 In that light it seems 
harsh to leave the rare customer whose claim arises after the delay 
period without recourse. 
2. Interlocking Loans 
The primary objective of interlocking loan provisions is to pre-
vent creditors from avoiding the restriction of creditor immunity in 
credit sales simply by changing the form of the transaction. For ex-
ample, in the normal third-party-financed credit sale, the merchant 
"supplies" the financing and then immediately sells the paper or as-
signs the contract to the creditor. Under the WCA, the creditor 
would be subject to the claims of the customer against the merchant 
for at least twelve months after notice of the assignment. On the 
other hand, if the customer had obtained a direct loan from the 
same creditor and used the proceeds to purchase goods from the mer-
chant, the WCA would not subject the creditor to customer claims 
against the merchant. Given this dichotomy, it would seem simple 
enough for the lender to retain his immunity by extending the credit 
directly to the customer. Presumably, the creditor could accomplish 
this merely by supplying the merchant with the proper forms.70 But 
such meaningless changes of form should not allow the creditor to 
escape the operation of the statute. 
On the other hand, in some circumstances the direct lender has 
no tie to the merchant, and it cannot be said that he has simply made 
the same loan directly that he would have made indirectly. In such a 
case, there is no justification for saddling the creditor with respon-
sibility resulting from the consumer's choice of merchants.71 The 
concept of the interlocking loan is intended to draw the line be-
tween those direct lenders who should sh3ire the responsibility for 
merchant failures and those who should not. 
Draftsmen of consumer-credit legislation now generally seem to 
agree that the direct lender should bear some responsibility when 
69. See note 60 supra. 
70. Quite often the indirect lender approves the loan before the merchant closes 
the deal. The actual assignment of the contract is merely a formality, and the distinc• 
tion between direct and indirect lending is meaningless. 
71. The MCCA would impose liability in many cases in which the lender has neither 
this connection with the merchant nor knowledge of which merchant the consumer will 
patronize. See note 74 infra. However, this view has not received general support. 
See Kripke, supra note 46, at 470-71 n.66; Littlefield, supra note 6, at 292-93 n.76, 
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the loan is closely related to the sale. While the UCCC is silent 
on this point, the UCCC Redraft adds provisions imposing such 
responsibility.72 Similarly, the National Commission recommends 
lender liability in "connected Ioans."73 
Original A.B. 1057 defined interlocking loans as those wherein 
the lender "participated in or was connected with the consumer 
transaction" in which the proceeds of the loan were used.74 The defi-
nition of "participated or connected"75 included, but was not limited 
to, all credit card transactions,76 loans wherein the seller referred the 
customer to the creditor,77 and the circumstance where "[t]he credi-
tor makes 20 or more loans in any calendar year, the proceeds of 
which are used in transactions with the same seller .... "78 Not only 
would a vast number of loans interlock under these provisions,79 but 
the open-ended definition of "participated or connected" would also 
make it impossible to evaluate prospectively whether a loan would 
interlock.80 This vagueness was anathema to creditors. Arguing that 
72. A lender who makes a consumer loan to enable the borrower to purchase or 
lease goods or services from a particular merchant may be subject to the consumer's 
claims or defenses against the merchant if 
(a) the lender knows that the seller or lessor arranged, for a ••. fee, for the ex-
tension of credit by the lender; (b) the lender is a person related to the seller or 
lessor unless the relationship is remote or is not a factor in the transaction; (c) 
the seller or lessor guarantees the loan or otherwise assumes the risk of loss by the 
lender upon the loan; (d) the lender directly supplies the seller or lessor with 
the contract document used by the consumer to evidence the loan, and the seller 
or lessor significantly participates in the preparation of the document; or (e) the 
loan is conditioned upon the consumer's purchase or lease of the goods or services 
from the particular seller or lender, but the lender's payment of proceeds of the 
loan to the seller or lessor does not in itself establish that the loan was [s]o 
conditioned. 
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 3.405 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). 
73. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 37-38. 
74. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(1). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(1). 
The MCCA changes this formulation. It makes the direct lender subject to con-
sumer claims and defenses unless he can show that he had no reason to know that 
the proceeds of tl1e loan would be used in a consumer transaction. MODEL CONSUMER 
CREDIT Acr § 2.603(3). While perhaps less vague, this provision is at least as broad as its 
NCA counterpart. 
75. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2). This provision is very similar to NCA section 2.407(2); 
however, the Wisconsin bill included one additional type of participation-when "[t]he 
creditor knows that the seller arranged the extension of credit by the creditor." A.B. 
1057, § 422.407(2)(c). 
76. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2)(h). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(2)(g). 
77. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2)(£). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(2)(e). 
78. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2)(e). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(d). 
79. The coincidence of a large-volume automobile or appliance dealer and a large 
lender in the same geographic area would undoubtedly result in satisfaction of the 
"20 or more loans" requirement in a very short time. In addition, the very common 
practice of referring a customer to a creditor would presumably result in interlock 
even though the referral may not have been exclusive and even though there may 
have been no referral agreement. 
80. Arguably, any time the proceeds of a loan are used to purchase goods, the 
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such a broad definition of interlocking loans would severely restrict 
the availability of direct credit, bank representatives quickly con-
vinced consumer representatives that these provisions operated far 
beyond their intended sphere. They suggested that it made more 
sense to define interlocking loans in terms of a finite number of spe-
cific activities and relationships. To that end, the section was en-
tirely redrafted. 
It was agreed, fairly uneventfully, that a lender must know or 
have reason to know that the "proceeds of the loan are used to pay 
all or a part of the customer's obligation to the [merchant] ... " if 
a loan is to interlock. 81 Once this precondition is met, there are six 
circumstances, any of which gives rise to an interlocking loan under 
theWCA. 
There was substantial agreement on the first four circumstances: 
(1) where the lender is "related to" the seller,82 (2) where the lender 
supplies the loan forms to the seller,83 (3) where the lender pays a 
commission to the seller,84 and (4) where the lender has a recourse or 
guarantee arrangement ·with the seller. 85 These four circumstances 
substantially coincide with provisions of the UCCC Redraft80 and 
the Commission Report.87 There is no such general agreement among 
the proposed consumer-credit legislation on the last two interlocking 
relationships enumerated in the WCA-credit-card sales and con-
sumer-credit transactions with known disreputable merchants. 
Intensive negotiations were necessary to determine the extent to 
which credit-card transactions would be subject to the interlocking 
loan provisions. As mentioned above, Original AB. 1057 included 
creditor has "participated in" or was "connected with" the sale. Presumably, the NCA 
draftsmen did not intend the application of section 2.407 to go this far, but it would 
be impossible to predict where its application might stop short of this. 
The MCCA draws this line more dearly. The lender is subject to consumer defenses 
unless he can show that he had no reason to believe that the loaned funds would be 
used in a consumer transaction, MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.603(3). 
81. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3). 
82. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(a). The definition of "related to" is set out 
in note 62 supra. 
83. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(b). 
84. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(c). 
85. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(d). 
86. Uniform Consumer Credit Code §§ 3.405(l)(a)-(d) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). 
87. COMMISSION RE!>ORT, supra note 23, at 37-38. Oddly, the Commission Report docs 
not include the fourth factor (recourse agreement) among those to be considered in 
evaluating closeness, even though an express agreement between merchant and creditor 
would be required. However, where such an agreement exists, the parties will probably 
fall within the Commission's sixth factor-repeated and regular loans resulting from 
merchant referrals. Id. at 38. 
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all credit-card purchases within this definition.88 This ·was totally 
unacceptable to the banks, which believed that an insurmountable 
accounting problem would be created if the majority of charge-card 
puchases were not exempted from the interlocking loan provisions: 
That is, if the customer could raise complaints as to small purchases 
-even if only a few customers exercised this option-it would take 
a tremendous amount of manpower to track down the individual 
transactions and charge them back to the merchant. To a business 
whose profitability depends on the minimization of human process-
ing time, this was a horrifying prospect. Consumer representatives, 
however, were not willing simply to exclude credit cards from the 
interlocking loan provisions. Banks that issue credit cards are cer-
tainly closely related to the merchants who honor their cards.89 The 
fact that credit is extended through the device of a credit card, rather 
than through a loan, does not alter the rationale for imposing credi-
tor responsibility. The banks, however, were able to convince the 
consumer representatives that, to a certain extent, credit cards are 
not truly a credit device but are merely a substitute for cash. That 
is, but for the card, the consumer would use cash to make smaller 
purchases rather than borrow money. Consumer representatives 
agreed that, in so far as the card is a cash substitute, the creditor is 
not really helping to keep the merchant in business and should not 
be subject to the customer's claims against the merchant. Lacking 
any empirical guidelines, the negotiators settled somewhat arbitrar-
ily on one hundred dollars as the point at which a credit-card pur-
chase becomes a loan rather than a mere expenditure of plastic 
money. Hence, the fifth circumstance in which interlock is found 
under the WCA is a credit-card purchase in excess of one hundred 
dollars.90 On such purchases the bank is subject to customer defenses 
against the merchant; for smaller charges, the customer cannot use 
such defenses.91 
88. A.B. 1057, § 422.407(2)(11). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.407(2)(g). 
The MCCA makes no change in this policy. Although there is no explicit reference 
to credit-card transactions, they are undoubtedly covered by the broad MCCA language. 
See MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr §§ 2.603(3)-(4). Certainly, the bank knows that the 
customer will use the credit card in consumer transactions. See note 74 supra. 
89. Typically, the bank and the merchant enter into a complex agreement that gives 
the bank the right to charge back to the merchant any purchase for which the customer 
refuses to pay and calls for the merchant to pay a percentage of the purchase price to 
the bank. See, e.g., New England Bankcard Assn., Operating Rules, arts. 7, 9. 
90. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(£). Of course, it was also necessary to 
except credit cards from the S!!ction creating interlock where there exists a recourse or 
guarantee agreement with the merchant. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(d). 
91. The section is worded in terms _of loans in excess of one hundred dollars. Pre-
sumably, this refers to each discrete transaction. Hence, if a number of items are pur-
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In retrospect, all negotiators seemed quite content with this re-
sult. The banks succeeded in escaping responsibility for merchant 
failures in the great majority of credit-card purchases. Further, the 
banks can protect themselves against the failures of a specific mer-
chant by establishing a limit of one hundred dollars for purchases 
from that merchant. Consumer representatives never considered this 
an area of particular abuse, since the bank credit card is primarily a 
middle class device; yet, the bank is subject to consumer claims and 
defenses in the case of large purchases, where the greatest possibility 
of abuse lies. 
The Commission Report recommends the same approach. How-
ever, it suggests a purchase price of fifty dollars as the point below 
which a credit-card purchase does not interlock.92 Of course, a fifty-
dollar cutoff point is as arbitrary as one of one hundred dollars. If 
the policy behind the limitation is that at some point credit cards are 
cash substitutes rather than credit devices, then the true cutoff point 
would depend on the buying habits of the individual customer. I 
therefore submit that the talk about "cash substitutes" simply pro-
vides a convenient rationale for performing a very practical task-
setting a cutoff point high enough that the bank's clerical operations 
are not severely encumbered, yet low enough to minimize the likeli-
hood of abuse. 
The U CCC Redraft also provides for a fifty-dollar purchase price 
minimum before subjecting the issuer of a bank credit card to the 
claims and defenses that the cardholder has against the merchant. 93 
However, it adds a second limitation-that the lender is not so sub-
ject unless the cardholder's residence and the place where the pur-
chase was made are within the same state or within one hundred 
miles of each other. Apparently this limitation is based on the pre-
sumption that the lender is unlikely to have a significant connection 
with a more distant merchant. By comparison, the WCA provision 
applies only to credit-card purchases made within Wisconsin but 
contains no such distance limitation.04 Also, the UCCC Redraft adds 
the limitation that the cardholder may assert his claim or defense 
chased at one time for a total exceeding 100 dollars, the transaction would interlock. 
The fact that more than one voucher may have been filled out should be irrelevant. 
However, this could yield the odd result that the purchase of a 25-dollar appliance 
interlocks because other goods were purchased at the same time. Of course, if the 
appliance turns out to be defective, the customer would have a defense only to the 
extent of 25 dollars. See note llO infra and accompanying text. 
92. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 38. 
93. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.403(2) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). 
94. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(f). 
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against the lender only after having attempted, in good faith, to ob-
tain satisfaction from the merchant.915 
The objective of the definition of interlocking loans, in so far as 
the five circumstances discussed above are concerned, is to delineate 
those situations in which the creditor and the merchant are so closely 
related that the creditor should not be allowed to escape responsibil-
ity for the merchant's conduct. There is, however, a second, and 
much more controversial, objective of the WCA interlocking loan 
provisions-to force the credit community to police retail merchants. 
Basically, the rationale is: Some policing is needed, neither the state 
nor the merchant community has performed the task satisfactorily, 
the creditor is better able to assume the function than the borrower, 
and the result of forcing creditors to police merchants will be a 
more equitable distribution of the costs of policing throughout the 
community.96 In theory, if the creditor is saddled with responsibility 
for merchant failures, creditors will refrain from financing purchases 
from the less reputable merchants in the community.97 Creditors, of 
course, do not feel that this burden should be theirs. 
In order to coerce creditor policing the definition of interlocking 
loans must be broad. If a loan interlocks only where the creditor and 
merchant have a manifest working agreement, no significant policing 
will result, for creditors will surely refrain from entering into such 
agreements with disreputable merchants. As long as the danger of 
interlocking is so easily avoided, there will be no impetus to refuse 
a loan to a customer who intends to apply the proceeds to the pur-
chase of goods or services from such a merchant. 
Original AB. 1057 contained no specific provision aimed to this 
end; however, its definition of interlock98 was so pervasive that no 
specifically directed provision was needed.99 When the section was 
95. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.403(3)(a) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). 
Certainly tbis makes good sense, but tbe provision's impact is likely to be minimal. 
The vast majority of customers will probably look first to tbe merchant as a matter 
of common sense. Moreover, since tbe banks are concerned about maintaining affable 
relationships with customers, they are not likely to ignore a complaint simply because 
tbe customer brought it to tbe bank first. Ratber, tbe Qank. is more likely to contact 
tbe merchant and to act as a mediator in tbe dispute. 
96. This view is not unique. For a tborough discussion of tbe competing policies 
and tbe suggestion that tbe UCCC deal witb tbis problem, see Littlefield, supra note 6, 
at 280-97. 
97. By "less reputable" or "disreputable" merchants, I mean merchants who, witb 
some regnlarity, fail to perform tbeir agreements witb customers or who fail to remedj 
valid complaints. 
98. See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra. 
99. Surely tbis result was intended by tbe draftsmen of tbe NCA. See NATIONAL 
CoNSUMER Acr § 2.407, Comment 2. 
The MCCA goes still furtber. The nonexclusive list of circumstances for which a 
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redrafted to define interlocking loans in terms of specific, identifiable 
relationships, consumer representatives insisted that a section coerc-
ing creditor policing be included. They would have liked every loan 
that found its way into the hands of a disreputable mechant to inter-
lock. Banks insisted that, at most, a loan should interlock only if it 
is made by a creditor who knows that the merchant is disreputable. 
The issue for negotiation was thus narrowed to what kinds of lender 
knowledge of merchant repute would give rise to interlock. The 
final formulation includes "knowledge from [the lender's] course of 
dealing with other customers of the [merchant] or from the lender's 
records, or written notice of substantial complaints by such other 
customers, that [the merchant] fails or refuses to perform his con-
tracts with them and ... fails to remedy such complaints within a 
reasonable time."100 Bank representatives now fear that this pro-
vision will have a more pervasive impact than they initially in-
tended. Consumer representatives, content with this result, suggest 
that knowledge of a merchant derived from other customers could 
reasonably include grapevine information and that ·written notice 
should include such sources as newspaper and better business bureau 
reports. It remains for the courts to establish the ultimate reach of 
the provision. 
Neither the UCCC nor the UCCC Redraft contains a knowledge-
of-disreputable-merchant provision. Apparently, the UCCC Special 
Committee agrees with creditors that the burden of policing retail 
merchants belongs elsew4ere. The National Commission, however, 
includes among the factors and incidents that it considers relevant 
to a determination of close connection, a provision nearly identical 
to that of the WCA.101 
The first-stage redrafting of the interlocking loan provisions was 
nearly totally acceptable to all creditors participating in the second-
stage negotiations. However, the consumer finance company repre-
sentatives did insist on one change: A prerequisite that "all or a 
meaningful part" of the proceeds of the loan be used in the pur-
chase102 was added to the definition of interlocking loans. Consumer 
lender will be "deemed to have knowledge" that the loan proceeds will be used in a 
consumer transaction is even more extensive than the NCA list of circumstances giving 
rise to participation or connection. Compare MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.603(4) 
with NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.407(2). 
100. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3)(e). 
101. CoMMISSION R.EPoRT, supra note 23, at 38. The Commission's terminology is 
somewhat illogical, since a creditor's knowledge of a merchant's reputation hardly 
establishes a close connection. 
102. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(3). 
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finance companies often make multipurpose loans. the proceeds of 
which might be used to consolidate existing loans or to purchase 
goods from more than one merchant. They argued that it was anom-
alous that an entire loan should interlock where only a small portion 
of its proceeds were applied to purchases from the merchant with 
whom the lender is said to have an interlocking relationship.103 
3. The Financial Liability Limit 
The final bank objective concerning the liability of third-party 
creditors was to reduce the extent to which a creditor might be liable 
on an individual claim. Original A.B. 1057 provided for creditor 
liability up to the amount of the total transaction in credit sales and 
up to the amount financed in the case of interlocking loans.104 The 
banks believed that since the creditor is not directly responsible for 
the merchant's failure, its liability should not in any event exceed 
the amount due on the obligation at the time the defense is raised. 
As suggested above,105 the Wisconsin consumer representatives 
felt that creditors kept many merchants in business by :financing 
their sales, 100 whether by purchasing the merchants' paper or by 
making interlocking loans.107 They felt that creditor liability should 
103. But note, where only a portion of an interlocking loan is used in the purchase 
on which the customer's claim is based, lender liability is limited to that amount. See 
note 110 infra. Why, then, should a small loan that would otherwise interlock not do 
so simply because it was not "a meaningful part" of a large multipurpose loan? 
104. A.B. 1057, § 422.406 (credit sales). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.406. A.B. 
1057, § 422.407(1) (connected loans). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.407(1). 
The MCCA extends the potential liability of the creditor beyond the transaction 
total. Credit-sale financers and lenders are both subject to all of the claims and defenses 
of the consumer arising out of the transaction financed. MoDEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r 
§§ 2.602(2) (credit sales), 2.603(2) (loans). The creditor can limit his potential liability 
if he acquires the obligation of the consumer "in good faith, for value, without notice 
of any claims, defenses or equities and continues to act in good faith" thereafter. 
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.603(2) (lenders). See also MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Am: 
§ 2.602(2) (credit sales). If these requirements are met the liability of a sales financer is 
limited to the transaction total, MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.602(2), and that of a 
lender is limited to the amount of the loan plus the finance charges. MODEL CONSUMER 
CREDIT Ac:r § 2.603(2). However, for the purposes of these provisions, a creditor is not 
in good faith if, having reason to know of a claim, he attempts to collect the obligation. 
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 2.601(3)(a). 
105. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. 
106. While there are, of rourse, many substantial retailers who carry their own 
credit, or at least a great deal of it, most merchants depend heavily on the availability 
of outside financing. The Wisconsin consumer representatives believed that much of 
the ronsumer abuse occurs at the hands of insubstantial, inefficient, and often under-
capitalized Jllerchants who, but for creditor support, would not be in business. 
107. While the interlocking lender does not supply the merchant's working capital 
as clearly as does the purchaser of the merchant's paper, the circumstances giving rise 
to interlock certainly call for some creditor responsibility. The NCA and A.B. 1057 
dichotomy in potential liability between "transaction total" in sales and "amount 
financed" on loans is apparently based on the presumption that the interlocking lender 
0 
" 
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extend to the amount of the entire transaction. Consumer repre-
sentatives realized, however, that primary responsibility should lie 
with the merchant. Hence, their objectives concerning creditor 
responsibility were twofold: First, where a valid consumer claim or 
defense arises, the consumer should be able to stop making payments 
and set off the value of any claim against the amount due; and, 
second, if the consumer has a claim in excess of the amount due and 
is unable to obtain redress against the merchant (for example, where 
the merchant is insolvent or unavailable), the customer should be 
able to look to the creditor. 
Once the objectives of the consumer representatives were clear, 
the negotiators were able to arrive at a mutually satisfactory com-
promise. They devised the following two-stage formula: First, the 
creditor is subject to customer claims and defenses to the extent of 
the amount owed at the time the defense is raised. Second, if judg-
ment against the merchant has been ~btained and execution re-
turned unsatisfied,108 the creditor is additionally liable up to the total 
amount financed (including finance charges). On the theory that the 
creditor is actually involved in the transaction only to the extent of 
the amount financed, the customer may look solely to the merchant 
for his down payment. This formula applies to both credit sales100 
and interlocking loans.110 
In sharp contrast to the WCA, the unwavering position of the 
UCCC Special Committee is that creditor liability should never ex-
tend beyond the amount due at the time that notice of the claim is 
received111 The National Commission, on the other hand, recom-
is somehow not as deeply involved in the transaction; that is, the interlocking lender is 
involved only to the extent of the amount of the loan, whereas the credit-sales financer 
is more like the merchant's partner. To the extent that the financing is essential to 
the merchant's operation, the distinction seems specious-a c~nclusion that the Wis-
consin negotiators reached without difficulty. 
108. Until this event has occurred, except where the merchant is in bankruptcy, 
receivership, or other insolvency proceedings, the debtor may assert any claims against 
the creditor only by way of counterclaim, defense to or set-off against claims brought 
by the creditor. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.407(5). This protects the creditor against 
being automatically joined in every action against the merchant; where the merchant 
is solvent, the creditor retains the prerogative to avoid involvement. Since the normal 
credit-sale financer is bound by the litigation, see note 114 and text accompanying 
notes 113-14 infra, the customer is not prejudiced by his inability to join the creditor. 
The provision was added late in the negotiations, chiefly at the insistence of the 
consumer finance companies. 
109. See Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 422.406(4) (regarding holders of negotiable 
instruments), 422.407(2) (regarding assignees of consumer contracts). 
110. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.408(4). Of course, this liability is limited to the 
portion of the loan used in the purchase on which the claim is based. 
111. UNIFORM C0Nsu111ER CREorr CODE §§ 2.404A, .404B. The UCCC Redraft suggests 
no change in this policy. UNIFORM CONSUl\lER CREDrr CODE §§ 8.403(3)(b), .404(2), .405(2) 
(Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). 
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mends substantially the same outside limits on creditor liability as. 
those adopted by the WCA, 112 but does not recommend that the 
customer be required to look first to the merchant for recovery of 
any claim in excess of the amount due on the account. I submit that, 
although it is more complex, the Wisconsin approach is preferable 
to those of the UCCC and the National Commission. Since the 
amount that is due when the claim is raised depends entirely on the 
time that the merchant's failure becomes apparent, the UCCC 
approach seems quite arbitrary. If the creditor is to be subject to 
customer claims against the merchant, I see no reason why his 
liability should be less if a defect in the goods or services appears six 
months after the sale than if the defect appears immediately. Also, 
where the customer's claim exceeds the amount due, requiring the 
customer to obtain judgment against the merchant is preferable for 
two reasons. First, it ensures that the party truly responsible for the 
claim will pay if possible. Creditor liability will exceed the amount 
due on the account only in the unusual case where execution against 
the merchant is returned unsatisfied. Second, it reduces the cost to 
the creditor that would arise if he were unnecessarily joined in cus-
tomer-merchant litigation. 
At first blush, these requirements seem to be an added burden for 
the consumer. However, the burden has been minimized in the 
WCA. If judgment against the merchant is obtained by default, the 
customer will not have been put to a great deal of trouble. If, in the 
case of credit sales, the issue of the merchant's failure to perform 
has been litigated the creditor is bound by the judgment.113 The 
situation is somewhat different in the case of interlocking loans, since 
the lender is not bound by any judgment that the customer may ob-
tain against the merchant.114 However, once the customer establishes 
that the loan interlocks, the creditor is likely to concede the issue of 
112. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 35-36. The Commission recommends that 
under negotiable instruments and contracts, liability should not exceed the original 
amount financed, whereas in the case of loans, liability should not exceed the lesser 
of the amount financed or the amount of the purchase made with the loan proceeds. 
Although not entirely clear, the "amount financed" presumably does not include 
finance charges. 
113. Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 422.406(4)(b), .407(2)(b). 
114. There is a sensible explanation for this different treatment of sales and loans. 
Presuming merchant liability, there is never any question as to the creditor's secondary 
liability in the case of sales. In the case of loans, however, the customer must first 
establish the existence of an interlocking loan as a condition precedent to lender 
liability. Hence, in the case of sales the creditor has clear impetus and opportunity 
to aid the merchant in his defense. The direct lender, on the other hand, might 
reasonably believe himself immune and thus ignore the merchant's handling of the 
case. If e.xecution is then returned unsatisfied and the customer can establish interlock, 
the lender should have the opportunity to relitigate the issue of the merchant's 
liability. 
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the merchant's liability. Even if the interlocking lender chooses to 
relitigate this issue, the customer is unlikely to be severely prejudiced 
since the WCA provides that the prevailing customer be awarded 
attorney's fees.115 
B. Delays in the Enforcement of Creditor Remedies: Default, 
Unilateral Deferral, Cure of Default, and Repossession 
The UCCC does not upset the common law policy that the defi-
nition of default be left a matter of contract between the parties. 
Many consumer advocates see this continuation of common law 
policy as one of the UCCC's major failings.116 In the consumer 
setting, the common law presumption of bargaining between the 
parties is a myth.117 The definition of default, as well as nearly all 
other contract provisions, is in the hands of the creditor. Unsur-
prisingly, some of the events of default found in consumer contracts 
bear only scant relation to the likelihood that the creditor will be 
paid.118 For example, payment of an installment even one day late is 
invariably a default. Further, the contract usually contains an ac-
celeration clause that gives the creditor the option, on default, of 
declaring the entire balance of the obligation immediately due and 
payable.119 Of course, where the debt is secured, default gives rise to 
the creditor's Uniform Commercial Code rights to repossess and 
dispose of collateral.120 
115. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.308. 
116. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 5.103, Comment 1; Clark, supra note 14, at 308, 
117. See Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMP, L.Q. 125 
(1962). 
118. For example, the pre-WCA motor vehicle security agreement form approved 
by the Wisconsin Banker's Association and the Wisconsin Installment Banker's Asso• 
ciation included the following among the events of default: death of the debtor or 
surety, failure to perform any obligation under the agreement, and "any other event 
which causes Secured Party, in good faith, to deem itself insecure." Regarding the 
likelihood of being paid, the death of a surety could certainly be meaningless, and 
relevance of the death of the debtor depends on the condition of his estate, Moreover, 
many of the debtor's obligations under the agreement, if not performed, might well 
bear no relation to the creditor's likelihood of receiving payment. For example, the 
debtor is obligated not to permit the value of the collateral to be impaired, regardless 
of the size of the impairment or the amount due on the obligation. Surely, a 200-dollar 
dent in the fender of a 3,000-dollar car is irrelevant to the bank if the outstanding 
balance is 1,000 dollars. Finally, the creditor could in good faith deem itself insecure 
on the basis of an erroneous tip that the debtor is about to abscond. 
To be sure, all the events of default defined in this security agreement could be 
relevant to the creditor's likelihood of being paid. However, nothing in the security 
agreement guarantees it. 
119. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURin' INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1195 (1965): "For a 
hundred years, it may be, no security agreement has failed to include an acceleration 
clause." See also J. WHI1E & R. 5UMJIIERS, HANDBOOK OF nu: I.Aw UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-3, at 958 (1972). 
120. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE §§ 9-501, -503 to -504. 
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Although the Wisconsip. consumer represt'!ntatives recogp.iied 
that creditors rarely ta.ke advantage of these defa,ult provisions, they 
felt that the common la.w policy gives creditqrs the powt'!r t9 dis-
crhninate in the individual case. A.1.tJ:wttgh sµch power might be 
justifiable in the commerdal setting, where it has been J:>argained 
qD.d paid for, the cqrn,umer representatives felt it ,has no legitimate 
place in the consumer-credit wqrld. They believed that no creditor 
should be allowed to take affirmative action against a consumer 
unless the contTIJ.ct })reach has a material jmpact on t4G creditor's 
likelihood of receiving payment and that mere delinquency on a 
single installment has p.q such iJllpact.121 They further believed that 
even where a debtor l}as committed a material breach he shoulcl be 
given a reasonable opportunity to reinstate the contract. Thus, in 
Original AB. 1057 they severely restricted the definition of defaµh 
and further regulated the circm:p.stances under whic;h. the cre.ditor 
could accelerate the obligation <;>r take any other action .. 
The negotiations concerning these provisiop.s were e~trem.ely 
arduous. Though all creditor groups were concerned, sp!ij.e were 
much more intensely concerned than others. lV[ap.y crf!dit<;>r§ rarely 
resort to repossession; they rely on §C;?<;urity interests, if ~t g}J, as a 
p~ychological tool to help iJ!q.u~e payment. Therl;!fore, they were 
willip.g to accept any scht'!me that would not severely disrupt their 
normal collection activitje§, H<;>wever, :rp.any other creditors, chiefly 
automobile financers, rely heavily on colJ~tt'!ral jn extending cr!;!dit. 
Repossession and disposal of collateral is an e§sential part of their 
business operation. Any delay in the accrual of their right to re-
possess or dispose of collateral may result in losses.122 Since the 
potential impact of these restricti<:ms OJ! th.eir interests was con-
siderable, their negotiating :position w~ intractable. 
1. Default and Unilateral Deferral 
Original A..B, 1057 defined d!;!fault as (4) failure to pay three 
successive installments when due, (b) failure to pay the balance due 
12J, See Crandall, supra note 21, ;it 357-58. Crf!Ild;tll, t:4e Jcey Wisi;opsiµ c;:qnsum\!r 
negotiator, emphasize& the need to reinstate tl!e doctrine oi IIJatep;il preach jµ con-
~umer rontracts and t]lat at common I.aw misi;ed paYIJlents alo11.e were not considered 
material enough to justify acceleration of the entire obligation. 
122. Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Reposse&sion: An Economic Analysis, in Brief for 
the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code as Amicus Curiae, 
app. A., at 26-34, Adams y. Southern Cal. First Natl, Bank, 42 U.S,L.W. 2~30 (9th Cir., 
Oct, 4, 1973), A version of Professor Johnson's paper can be found in 47 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 82 (1973). 
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within three months of the date for final payment, or (c) delinquency 
on installments totaling thirty per cent of the amount financed.128 
It also provided that if the customer were ten days delinquent on any 
installment, he had the unlimited right to (I) defer the payment, (2) 
refinance the unpaid balance, or (3) consolidate the unpaid balance 
with that of another transaction.124 Since the effect of each provision 
is to delay accrual of the creditor's right to take action against the 
debtor, the definition of default and the unilateral deferral-refinance-
consolidation right became a single package in negotiations. 
At first-stage negotiations, bank representatives were initially 
concerned that default was defined only in terms of nonpayment.126 
They argued that credit is often extended in genuine reliance on 
collateral and that in such cases, if the actions of the debtor 
jeopardize the value of the collateral or the creditor's ability to 
realize on it, the creditor ought to be able to protect his interest. The 
banks did not have much difficulty convincing consumer repre-
sentatives that if the vendor were powerless to protect his security 
interest, collateral-based credit would be severely restricted and 
low-income consumers would find it difficult to buy cars. Hence, 
consumer representatives agreed to include in the definition of de-
fault the customer's failure to observe a covenant in the contract, 
"breach of which materially impairs the condition, value or protec-
tion of or the creditor's right in" the collateral.126 On the theory that 
the unsecured creditor needs similar protection, a breach that "ma-
terially impairs the customer's ability to pay" was also included.127 
123. A.B. 1057, § 425.103(1). See NATIONAL CoNsUMER Ac:r § 5.103(1). The "amount 
financed" docs not include the finance charge. A.B. 1057, § 421.301(5); NATIONAL 
CoNsu11mR Ac:r § 1.301(5). The MCCA discards this formula. The primary thrust of its 
approach is that the debtor is in default when he is delinquent on installments amount-
ing to more than fifteen per cent of the transaction total. See MoDEL CONSUMER CREDIT 
Ac:r § 7.102. There is no provision for default arising from debtor conduct other than 
nonpayment. 
124. A.B. 1057, § 422.203(1). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2,203(1). 
125. For reasons unclear to me, draftsmen of the NCA considered this a funda-
mental principle. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r § 2.203, Comment 1. 
126. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.103(2)(c). 
127. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.103(2)(c). This phrase came in on the heels of 
the collateral-jeopardy provision. Consequently, and unfortunately, it did not receive 
much attention. The result is far too broad a grant of power to the creditor, power 
the creditor docs not need. To be sure, there are circu10Stances in which the unsecured 
creditor needs to act quickly to protect his interests, such as when the debtor makes a 
fraudulent conveyance or begins to move his personalty out of the state. Indeed, these 
are the sort of circu10Stances that the WCA draftsmen had in mind. But the broad 
material-impairment-of-ability-to-pay provision extends far beyond such extreme cir-
cu10Stances. Presumably, events such as loss of job, illness, and divorce can amount to a 
default under this provision-even before the debtor's next payment is due. Con• 
ceivably, the creditor whose forms contain the right debtor covenants will hold the 
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Creditor representatives at the second stage had no objections, and 
the section was adopted as revised. 
The definition of default• as three successive installments out-
standing was totally unacceptable to all creditors, so it was discussed 
early in the first stage of negotiations. The possibility that a debtor 
could, without default, miss two installments, pay one, and then miss 
two more was mind-boggling. Although creditor representatives were 
willing to agree that default based on a one-day delinquency may be 
too severe, they were quite concerned about the potential losses that 
result from any significant delay in the accrual of repossession rights. 
Therefore, they argued that default should occur within a reason-
ably short time after a payment is missed. 
Consumer representatives never truly expected the original defi-
nition to remain. Yet they staunchly opposed the accrual of creditor 
remedies as a result of a single late payment.128 They were willing 
to discuss such a definition of default, however, since under Original 
A.B. 1057, the debtor who was having difficulty meeting his payment 
schedule could elect to modify the contract terms.129 The creditors, 
of course, were hardly pleased with the prospect of unilateral modifi-
cation. 
It took creditor representatives little time to convince consumer 
representatives that unilateral refinance and consolidation were 
simply unworkable. The exercise of such rights would have req_uired 
the complete rewriting of the contract with new terms, payment 
schedules, and other arrangements, which would simply not be pos-
same power he once held under the now infamous insecurity clause. Surely, such 
creditor latitude is unjustifiable. Any impaired-ability-to-pay test should be limited to 
those cases where the creditor has a legitimate need to act quickly to protect his 
interests. Otherwise, where collateral is not jeopardized, the creditor should be required 
to wait until a default in payment has occurred. 
Of course, this result could be achieved through a very strict construction of "mate-
rial impairment," either by administrative rule or by the Wisconsin courts. It is to be 
hoped that such a construction will be adopted. 
128. The materiality of a single delinquent payment is not susceptible to easy 
analysis-especially in a vacuum. The true significance of a delinquency is not the 
injury to the creditor. Rather, a delinquency is significant because it is an indication 
that later payments might not be made. If a customer has consistently paid prior in-
stallments within ten days of the date due, a five-day delinquency indicates nothing. 
On the other hand, if a debtor has a poor payment record and if his contract has just 
been renegotiated, a five-day delinquency might be a strong indication that more 
trouble is in the offing. To repossess the first debtor's car after a five-day delinquency 
hardly seems justifiable. In the second instance, however, the equities seem to have 
changed-the delinquency seems more material. In both cases, we know more than 
the mere fact that there was a single delinquency. The surrounding facts were critical 
to the evaluation of materiality; they were critical to the "indication value" of the 
delinquency. Hence, consumer representatives were probably correct in asserting that 
a single delinquency, of itself, should not be a default. 
129. A.B. 1057, § 422,203(1). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Am: § 2.203(1). 
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sjble in a unilfl.t!;!ral sense; to !jet dmrn statutqry guidelines for such 
contracts would also have been impossible. Consumer representatives 
readily agreed to eliminate these provisions, Tp.ei;r pri111-Firy concern 
was really the right to def~r payments. Yet, without limitations this 
provision woµld also be unworkable, for it would allow the debtor to 
defer all installments indefinitely, Thus, the problem at the first 
stage was narrowed to finding a mutually satisfactory combination 
of a strict default definition. plus a restricted unilateral deferral 
right, The result Wfl.S that a complex list of limitations accompanied 
the unilateral deferral right, 130 while default was defined as a single 
delip.quency of wore than ten days or a material breach of some other 
covenant. 
This agreement, however, proved to be short-lived, as aecond-
stage creditor representatives were far from satisfied. Even aa limited, 
the concept of up.ilateral deferral waa disconcerting, especially to 
consumer finance comp,mies. It was seen as a source of accounting 
problems, especia.lly for computerized credit operations, and. as a 
papenvork burden since every clelinquent debtor wpuld have to be 
notified of his deferral right. M,oreover, ~d one of the most signifi-
cant creditor objections, contract adjustments have always been 
seen as ~ accommodation to the cu~tomer, and creditors thought 
that they should be able to choo~e those customers to whom such 
favors should be extended. Where the customer has a legitimate 
reason (such as illness or layoff) for his inability to make a payment, 
creditors ip.ay normally be willing to make adjustment. But the 
thought of a deadbeat being able to defer payments at will was a 
particularly bitter pill. 
Due largely to the efforts of consumer finance company repre-
sentatives, an uneasy compromise was eventually reached. The 
l.lnilateral deferral right was thrown out entirely, and the definition 
of default for nonpayment became concurrent delinquency of more 
than ten days on any two installments.131 The rationale was that 
giving the debtor one "free" missed payment is tantamount to an 
automatic deferral. The creditor cannot take action against the 
debtor for one delinquent payment. However, the creditor knows 
when default occurs, accountin~ problems are minimized, and the 
130. Among the limitations were: (I) No payment could be deferrecl for IIJore than 
180 dars; (2) no right of deferral would exist for any of the first six installments; and 
(3) n9 more than two installments coulcl be deferred in any twelve-month period. 
1/ll. Wisconsin Consumer Al;t § 425.103(2)(a). If tl).e interval between payments is 
m9;re th;m two mpµths, default is defip.ed ilS a, delinquency of more than 60 days. On 
open-end plans, default is failur~ to :iµake payment wl).en due on two occasiqns within 
a 12-month period, Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.103(2)(b). 
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choice as to who obta,ins a furth~r deferral remains with the 
creditor.132 Of coµrse, a special provision was p.~eded where the 
debtor failed to pay the fin~! installment. Creditors also ~onyinced 
consumer represen~tives t:4at special treatment sh,;mld be given to 
failure to pay the first installment.133 It was agreed that the! d,efiniti9n 
of {iefault in either case would be failure to make ~uch payment 
within forty days of the date dut.134 • 
The Nation;tl. ComIJ).ission takes a somewhat pt!-zzling position 
on this point. It suggests that ~efault shquld not 'J:?e d~fip.~d l;>y 
statute, but should be left to the determination of the contra,cting 
parties. It adds, however, that default should re$ult only frqi:µ the 
breach of "major contract provisions" <!lld that it should not result 
solely because the creditor believes the prospect of payment has been 
impajred.135 Apparently, the Coxp.mission simply 4ope~ that crecljtors 
wjll follow these guidelines, but it suggests no reason for its obkctiqn 
to statutory enforcement pf this hoped-for ;result. Another g.~cid~d 
difference b~tween the Commission point of view aI!d the WCA is 
that the Commissjpn considers failure to make timely payments to 
Pe a breach of a major contract provisio:Q.136 and believe§ that fl.ffprd-
ing the debtor a rigJ.it tq cure offers sufficient protecti9n f;rom im-
providep.t creditor a~tion.137 
Notably, the DCCC Special Committee has changed its positjop. 
and now suggests regulation of t:4~ definition of default to an ~~tent 
nearly identical to tp.~ recommendation of the National Comµiis-
sionJ88 
132. Of course, the WCA allow~ deferral by agree~ent (~ectiq!l ~~.g0f(!)), a!l4 aJs9 
;illow~ agreements permitting unila~eral !fefeq;il :i.t the ~lec;tion of the geditqi; (~~ctj9:t1 
422.204(8)). Since the debtor may prepay all or part of the obligation at any time with-
out pepalty (section 422~08), tp.e creditqr'11 unilateral deferral right will not worl,. to 
the detriment pf tl!e debtor except to tlie CJ1:te11t of µte deferral i;h~rge, 
133. Many creditors seem to attach special importance to the first installment, inter-
preting failure to pay it promptly as an indication of bad faith on the part of the 
debtor. Arguably, failure to make this payment is a !llOre material breach ¢.an failure 
to pay some other in~tallment. In addition, the first installment is occasionally larger 
than the remaining scheduled installments, for it is more like a part of the do,vn-
payment than of the amount fin~ceq. A~ ~y r.J.t~, CQnsuzg~j'." repr~se!l~tive§ q!d. not 
see this as a common area of abuse or an unreasonable creditor desire, 
134. Wisconsin Consumer ,Act § 425.1Q3(2}(a). IQiti~Uy, ~ a resµJt qf. 11, i:lerjµtl ~µ-or, 
the WCA. did not reflect th!! i\greement reached QP. this pqjpt, Rath~, a ,:Iefatilt l!-S tP 
the first or last installment was defined as mere failure to pay when ,:lue, Thi~ eqor 
has p.Qw been q:>rrected by ad):n.injs~tive rule. See WIS. ADMIN. CopE, :flANKffi9 § ~0.60 
(197;1), 
135. COMIIIISSIOij REPO~T, ~upr{l note g3, at 25. 
136. Id. 
137. Iµ. See discussjo11- in t~t accol)lpan~g notes l;l9-58 infrq. 
138. The UCCC Redraft makes enforceable an agreeI)lent defining defauJt ••only to 
tpe ~tept that {I) th~ consµmer fails to I)lake a p~}'!!ll;nt a§ reqµiraj by ?gr~!!!l!ent; 
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2. Cure of Default 
A statutory right to cure default requires that before the creditor 
is entitled to take any action he notify the debtor of the default and 
give him a certain .amount of time within which to pay the amount 
of any delinquent installments, without acceleration, or to tender 
whatever performance is necessary to cure any default other than 
nonpayment. Having cured, the debtor is reinstated, without pen-
alty, to the position he would have been in had no default occurred. 
The National Commission found in its survey of creditor practices 
that before declaring an account delinquent, banks allow an average 
of 12.2 days and finance companies an average of 16.5 days.180 It 
recommends a statutory 14-day cure period, which would merely be 
the adoption of current industry practice.140 
Because of this industry practice, and because they had pre-
viously agreed to accept a cure provision in the UCCC negotia-
tions,141 Wisconsin creditors were not adverse to the concept of a 
right to cure. In fact, some of them were staunchly in favor of it.142 
Rather, the debate centered upon questions of (1) the procedure to 
be-followed in effecting notice and cure, (2) whether the right should 
be forfeitable, and (3) exceptions to the right (that is, when, if at all, 
the creditor should be able to take action without affording the 
debtor notice and opportunity to cure). 
First-stage negotiators eventually agreed that the procedure for 
notice and cure set out in Original A.B. I 057 should be scrapped. 
It had provided that notice of the right and initiation of the running 
of the cure period could be effected only by service of a complaint in 
an ac6on brought by the creditor for possession of collateral.143 If 
the debtor cured within fifteen days after service, the action would 
be dismissed.144 Negotiators saw no virtue in requiring the creditor 
or (2) the prospect of payment, performance, or realization of collateral is significantly 
impaired •••• " UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.109 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972), 
The UCCC contains no provision restricting events constituting default. 
139. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 25, 43. 
140. Id. at 25. 
141. Although the UCCC contains no right to cure, the Wisconsin UCCC legislative 
advisory committee had included in its recommendation a one-time-per-transaction 
twenty-day cure period. 
142. The collection practice of sending simulated legal process to delinquent debtors 
has recently come under attack as being unconscionable. Since this practice had been 
effective in inducing payment, and since affording the debtor a right to cure entails 
sending him an official notice of the right, many creditors welcomed the change. 
143. The only way to obtain possession under the WCA is by filing suit. See text 
accompanying notes 167-76 infra. 
144. A.B. 1057, §§ 425.206-.207. See NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT §§ 5,206-,207. The 
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to file suit in order to bring his default rights to fruition.145 More-
over, this procedure seems particularly frivolous when the creditor 
does not want possession of the collateral or when there is no security 
interest at all. Therefore, first-stage negotiators settled, without 
serious difficulty, on a simplified procedure. Upon default, a fifteen-
day cure period begins to run from ·written notice by the creditor of 
the customer's right to cure. The passage of this period is a pre-
requisite to the creditor's exercise of any other rights or remedies.146 
In keeping with the new definition of default, cure is effected by 
tender of any balance due or by "tendering performance necessary 
to cure any default other than nonpayment of amounts due."147 In 
retrospect, all negotiators seem quite content with this much more 
workable procedure. 
The second right-to-cure issue during negotiation was whether 
a recalcitrant debtor should ever lose the right to cure, and, if so, 
when. Suppose, for example, that a debtor buys a new car on credit, 
the contract to be paid off in three years, with payments to be due 
on the first of the month. For the first six months of the contract, the 
debtor consistently makes his payment twenty to twenty-five days 
late. Each month he receives at least two late notices and, occasion-
ally, a phone call from the bank's collection department. In the 
seventh month, the debtor makes no payment, and on the eleventh 
day of the eighth month the bank, having received no payment, 
MCCA retains the basic scheme, which requires that the creditor file suit in order to 
initiate the running of the cure period. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 7.108(1). The 
basic changes are that under the MCCA the debtor may cure at any time prior to 
judgment and that the creditor may require the debtor to pay court costs and a per-
formance deposit in addition to making up back payments. MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT 
Acr § 7 .108(2). There are no exceptions to the MCCA right to cure, nor is there any 
limit to the number of times a debtor may cure during the course of a transaction. 
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 7.108(5). 
145. Arguably, the only reason the creditor would want the cure period to run is 
so that he can accelerate the loan and sue for possession. However, where the debtor 
would cure, putting the creditor to the expense of filing suit seems unnecessary. More-
over, even where the debtor does not cure, the expense is unjustifiable unless the 
creditor actually wants possession of the collateral. It might be argued that the creditor 
who does not want the collateral has no need for the cure period to run, since he can 
always try to induce payment through normal collection methods. However, the ability 
to accelerate the obligation is of value to the creditor even though he does not seek 
possession of collateral. It allows him to write off the debt and attempt to collect it or 
assign it to a collector as a lump sum. This saves him the trouble of keeping track of 
how many payments have gone unpaid. Perhaps the draftsmen of the NCA intended 
to inhibit acceleration to as great an extent as possible regardless of impact on creditor 
operations. The Wisconsin consumer representatives, however, sought only to provide 
the debtor with an opportunity to cure while minimizing the impact on creditor 
practices. 
146. Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 425.104-.105. 
147. Wisconsin Consumer Act§ 425.105(2). 
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sends the debtor notice of his right to cure, Within fifteen days the 
debtor makes the two back payments plus delinquency fees, and the 
contract fa reinstated. The debtor then misses the ninth payJP.ent. 
When the tenth payment is ten days past due, notice of right to cure 
is again sent, and the debtor cures within the fifteen-day period, 
When the eleventh ip.stallment is not received, the bank contacts the 
debtor in hope of helping him solve his apparent 6.nancial woes-
perhaps to extend the contnict and reduce the monthly payments, 
perhaps to consolidate other obligatiops iµto a single lower monthly 
payment. The debtor is not cooperative; he may even be surly. 
At this point, the bank has invested substaptjal effort in the 
account, with no let-µp in sight. The cost of collecting the debt is 
beginning to approach the profit on the loan. Some banks, espe-
cially those that prefer not to deal with higher risk borrowers, 
quickly become fed up with troublesome debtors and make a point 
of getting them off the books as soon as possible. In negotiations, 
creditor representatives argued that at some poiJ1t a recalcitrant 
debtor ought to lose his right to cure; an unlimited right to cure 
could cause creditors a great deal of troµble and possibly some un-
toward expense, At the bottom of their argument may have been 
the feeling that the debtor does not deserve an unlimited right to 
cure.148 
Consumer representatives saw no reason why the debtor should 
ever lose the right to cure, for if the debtor cures, the creditor re, 
ceives full interest on the late installments plus a delinquency fee 
that should at least help to cover the cost of collection. However, 
consumer representatives were willing to limit the right to cure 
since, at the end of first-stage negotiations, the debtor still had a 
µnilateral deferral right. Thus, even if the debtor were to lose his 
right to cure, he could still eliminate any nonpayment default by 
electing to .defer the delinquent payment. Consequently, at the 
end of first-stage negotiations, the debtor was allowed only one cure 
opportunity in any twelve-month period. 
As discussed above, the unilateral .debtor deferral right, ev13n as 
limited in first-stage negotiations, was distressing to many second-
stage creditors. They were intent on eliminating the right, but its 
148. Although it was only articulated tangentially, I received the impression from 
interviewing creditors and creditor representatives that the specter of the deadbeat 
loomed over the negotiations. The true deadbeat, a debtor who has the ability to pay 
but does not, is probably quite rare. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 43. The 
Commission's survey showed deadbeathood to be among the least common reasons for 
failure to meet contractual terms. Nevertheless, when a creditor encounters the real 
thing, it makes his blood boil. 
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existehce had played a key tole in the consumer agreement to limit 
the right to cure. Heflce, second-stage creditor insistence on the 
elimination of tiiillaterai deferral necessarily undermined the fitst-
stage agreerrtent reached on cure-just as it undermined the first-
stage agreement oh default. Finally, as part of the decision to 
eliminate the unilateral deferral right, the negotiators agreed to 
ptovide the debtor with a right to cure default twice within any 
twelve-month period.149 Thus, our hypothetical debtor, having cured 
default fot the second time within twelve mohths, would lose his 
right to cure until one year after the first cure. If, at some time 
prior to that date, he is in default, the creditor's right to seek 
possession of the collatetal accrues immediately. The right to cure it-
self never changes; that is, wliete the right to cure exists, the respec-
tive rights and obligations of the debtor and the creditor are un-
affected by the number of times the debtor has previotisly cured. 
In retrospect, the Wisconsin ctihsumet representatives ate un-
happy with the result reached, They ate consoled, however, by their 
belief that because the right to cute is difficult to lose, such an event 
should be rare,150 
The final cute-related issue, that of exceptions to the tight, was 
resolved at second-stage negotiations,151 Cteditots argued that special 
citcumstances, such as where a creditor has a pdssessory' security in-
terest in securities that threaten to decline rapidly in valtie or where 
he believes that the debtor inteiids to conceal or remove collateral 
from the jurisdiction, may require a secured creditor to act quickly. 
They argued that prohibiting action that could prevent such losses 
was not in the interest of the paying consumer, who would Ulti-
mately shoulder the burden of the loss. 
Consumer representatives were easily convinced that, when col-
lateral in the hands of the debtor threatens to decline severely in 
value, it is in the interest of all parties to liquidate it. Consequently, 
an e~ception was created fot this situation.152 Fot a number of 
reasons, hoiv-evet, consumer representatives were not willing to 
149. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.105(3), 
150. Since the great majority of defaults ate due to events beyond the debtor's 
control, see ComnssmN REPORT, supra note 23, at 43, the number of defaulting debtors 
who get more than teh days behind on two payments and are then able to cure should 
be few, The number who do sci repeatedly, yet in good faithj should be extraordinarily 
rare. 
151. First-stage negotiations had not produced agreement, and A,B. 1057 as modified 
in December contained no exceptions to the right to cure, although a restraining order 
to protect collatetal had been created, The banks continued to be involved in the 
negotiations, however, and played an important role in the resolution of this issue. 
152, Wisconsin Consumer Act § 4-25.105(4). 
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create any further exceptions. First, they believed that creditors 
sometimes rely on the possibility of concealment or removal of col-
lateral as an excuse for an otherwise unjustifiably quick repossession. 
They also believed that actual preventive repossessions were quite 
rare and that the over-all economic impact of prohibiting such re-
possessions would not be great. In addition, they had serious doubts 
about the reliability of most reports concerning removal in that 
these are normally received from neighbors, estranged spouses, and 
relatives, many of whom have axes to grind or are merely repeating 
gossip. Finally, consumer representatives had agreed at first-stage 
negotiations to allow a creditor to obtain a court order restraining 
a debtor from jeopardizing collateral. They believed that such an 
order, backed by the court's contempt power, would effectively 
stifle most potential skips and adequately protect creditors. As a 
result of these views, consumer representatives took a firm stand 
against any additional exceptions to the right to cure. Creditor 
representatives were unable to soften this position.153 
The ability o~ consumer representatives to withstand political 
pressure to limit drastically the right to cure is extremely significant, 
in my view, because this is the only point at which the WCA cure 
provisions force any substantial change in normal creditor opera-
tions. In general, a creditor will not repossess collateral soon after 
default unless there is some special reason for believing that he 
will not ultimately receive full payment. However, in these unusual 
circumstances the fifteen-day delay will force creditors to alter 
definitively their normal patterns. The impact of this change re-
mains to be seen.154 
The cure procedure recommended by the National Commission 
is essentially the same as that in the WCA. The Commission also 
recommends that the repeatedly recalcitrant debtor lose his right 
to cure and suggests that he be allowed to cure only three times 
during the term of the contract.155 Although it is not clear whether 
153. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.207. 
154. One automobile finance company spokesman told me that quick repossession 
occurs most commonly after the creditor has spent a lot of time with the debtor trying 
to iron out the debtor's credit difficulties. If the creditor is skeptical about the debtor's 
good faith, any delinquency immediately after the discussions is likely to be met with 
immediate repossession. Consequently, the knowledge that quick action is prohibited 
might decrease the willingness of some creditors to work with a debtor whose credibil• 
ity is marginal. 
155. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 25. The objective of any loss-of-cure 
formula is apparently to draw the line between the good faith debtor, who should be 
allowed to cure whenever he can, and the deadbeat, with whom the creditor should 
presumably be allowed to deal more harshly. No rationale is given for the Commission's 
choice of formulation, just as there really is none for the WCA choice, the latter 
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the Commission considered exceptions to the right, it recommends 
none. 
Making nearly unanimous the view that some right to cure ought 
to be afforded to the consumer, the UCCC Redraft has added cure 
provisions.156 However, the proposed consumer protection falls far 
short of that in either the WCA or the Commission Report. The 
UCCC Redraft provides a once-per-transaction, twenty-day cure 
period where the debtor is ten days delinquent on a scheduled pay-
ment.157 Further, there is no right to cure defaults other than non-
payment. The utility of such a limited right seems questionable.158 
3. Recovery of Collateral 
Upon default the UCC allows the secured creditor to, among 
other things, take possession of the collateral without judicial pro-
cess, 169 sell it, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the outstand-
ing debt.160 This ability to act quickly upon default assures the 
creditor that the collateral will have maximum value when repos-
sessed and that his potential loss will be minimized. The efficient 
limitation of creditor losses clearly benefits the paying customer by 
increasing the availability of secured loans and reducing creditor 
overhead, which would othenvise be passed on to the consumer. In 
spite of these benefits, however, this summary procedure has come 
under serious constitutional attack. The attack, which stems from 
the landmark Supreme Court decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance 
having been simply a matter of compromise. I doubt, however, if it really makes much 
difference, as long as more than one or two opportunities to cure during the contract 
are provided. See note 150 supra. 
156. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 5.110, .111 (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). 
157. This, in effect, slightly modifies the definition of default. Until the debtor has 
once been afforded his right to cure the creditor may not take action prior to the tenth 
day of delinquency. 
158. Its utility seems particularly questionable in light of the UCCC Redraft defini-
tion of default. When a single ten-day delinquency can result in loss of the right, there 
has hardly been a distinction drawn between the good faith debtor and the deadbeat. 
If the rationale is that the creditor is in a better position to draw this line than the 
legislature, why provide a right to cure at all? 
The limitation of the right to nonpayment defaults also seems unjustified. If the 
default is failure to procure insurance or failure to assist in perfecting the security 
interest, especially if the default arises out of ignorance, why should the debtor not be 
given the opportunity to cure? Are these defaults somehow more material than non-
payment? Perhaps certain kinds of nonmonetary defaults are more dangerous to the 
creditor's interests than delinquency in payment. If so, perhaps exceptions from the 
right to cure are justified in those circumstances. But the broad exclusion of all non-
monetary defaults seems contrary to the objective of a right to cure. 
159. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9--503. 
160. UNIFORM COIIIMERµAL CODE § 9-504. 
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Corp.161 mid the inore recent decisioh in Fuentes v. Shevin,1°2 cen-
ters upon the theory that the defaulting debtor, in being dispossessed 
df the collatetal without notice ot opportunity to object, is d<:lprived 
of his property without the due process of the law guarartteed by 
the fourteenth amendment. The issue is now being litigated,103 and 
itS ultimate resolution is, as of this writing, uncertain.104 
A legislative dilemnHt, however, exists quite apart from the con• 
stitutiorta1 oile:165 Eveh if self-help repossession is constitutiomtlly 
permissible, the legislature inust stili decide whether the admitted 
urifairness to at least the occasional debtot166 can be sigrtificarttly te-
duced through procedural safeguards, whether such safeguards can 
be constructed so as to have a mitlimal impact on creditor costs, and 
whether the increase in costs, to the extent it is inescapable, is 
justified by the amount of protection afforded the debtor. 
The question of whether prejudgment self-help repossession 
would be available in Wisconsin was never really in issue during 
the WCA negotiations. In the eyes of consumer representatives, this 
was not a hegdtiable matter. They believed that, regardless of in-
creased creditor costs, no debtor should be deprived of his ptoperty 
without having an opportunity to object. First-stage cr<:lditot' repre• 
sehtatives were particularly concerned about preventing the com-
plete loss of self-help repossession. Therefore, they did not press 
161. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
162. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
163. A number of courts have considered this question. White, The Abolition of 
Self-Help Reposses5ion: The Poor Pa'j Even More, 1973 WIS. L. REv. 503, MS I'.: n.1. 
In the on~ case irl which the trial cotirt found self-he1p tepossession to be a denial 
of due process, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground 
that there was no state action involved. Adams V, Southern Cal. First Natl, Bank, 42 
U.S.L.W, 2230 (Oct. 4, 1973), revg. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S,D, Cal. 1972). 
For discussions of the state action aspects of such cases, see Martin, Secured Transac• 
tions, 19 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 593, 638-41 (1973); White, supra, at 504-10. 
164. See generally Regenfuss, Self-Help Remedies After Fuentes v, Sllevin, 47 FLA, 
B.J. 155 (1973); White, supra note 163; Casenote, 8 LAND&: WATER L. REv, 315 (1978). 
165, Even if the Court balances the various interests and tosts and d!!cld!!S, M 
suggested by Professor White, that there is no due protess violation, see White, Stlfn'ti 
note 163, at 510-30, such a holding is not binding on state legislatures, which remuln 
free to provide their citizens with more protection than is required by the federal 
Constitutiofi. 
166. Surely, the repossession of collateral where the debtor bas a valid defense but 
n~ tlpportunity to assert it is an unfortunate occttrrence. Not only is the ittt:Hvldual 
ilijhred, but genetal confidence in the law is undermined. One consumer represchtatiVd 
told nie that his legal aid clients invariably felt left ottt and that they perceived some 
fotiri of conspiracy bet.ween the courts and the tar dealers. He felt that the social tost 
of permitting prejudgment self-help repossession far exceeds the pecuniary cost of 
denying it. 
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£or a prejudgment self-help remedy, but argued vigorously fot the 
availabllity of self-help executioh.167 
Original A.B. 1057 required the cteditor who sought to re~ 
possess to file suit for possessiort. If the customer wished to bbject, he 
would have five days to file a demand for a hearing, which would be 
scheduled as soon as possible. If a "substantial question" as to the 
creditor1s rights should appear, a final hearing wotild be held.168 At 
tio time, either before or after judgment for possession, wciS self~ 
help repossession pertnitted.169 
At the outset, however, consumer representatives recdgn1zed that 
the elimination of postjudgment self-help repossession was art. exten° 
sitln well beyond the limited requirements of Sniadach176 and that 
etnpioym.eht of the sheriff to repossess collateral is slow and expen-
sive. They were willing ta permit self-help repossession aftet judg-
ment if provisions that adequately inhibited violence could be 
drafted.171 At their urging, the WCA, by the end of first-stage 
negotiations, provided that, in seir-help repossessforts, the creditor 
could neithet tommit a breach of the peace nor enter a dwelling 
used by the customer as his residehce. 
The negotiators chose not tb force the Wfaconsih courts to devise 
strikingly new procedures, but father decided to use the Wisconsin 
small claims courts as the fon1nii72 for obta1tiing judgment for 
possession. Since the return date ih small claims courts can be as 
eariy as eight days after mailing of process,i73 this forum. provides a 
speedy resolution of the possession issue. The requirement that the 
debtor request a hearing was elin1mated, so that the WCA simply 
i67. The banks presumed that a -very small portion of defaulting debtors would 
actually appear and raise valid defenses. Thus, they assumed that once the return ciate 
passed, they would be in substantially the same position as under pre-WCA law. 
168. A.B. 1057, § 425.208. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 5.208. 
169. A.B. 1057, § 425.204. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 5.204. The MCCA contains 
a similar provision requiring judicia1 process iii the repossession of collateral. MonEL 
CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 7.202. However, the MCCA provides for the issuance of such 
process before judgment where necessary to obtain jurisdittion over the debtor or 
where the debtor "is about to remove the property from tlie state With the intent to 
defraud the creditor?' Moi:JEI. CoNsUMER CREDIT ACT § 7.205(3). 
170. Of. NA'tloNAi. CoNsiJt.ifa Acr § 5.208, Coni.Ilieilt 1 (indicatitlg that Stiiddach 
supplies the primary rationale for tlie NCA approach). 
171. Presumably, although there is no comment to this effect, the NCA rationale 
underlying the tomplete elimination of self-help repossession is that the likeiihbod of 
violence is decreased if the sheriff is always present. 
172. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(1). Of course, the small claims court juris-
dictional limit on amount in issue, WIS. STAT. § 299,01(3) {1971), was mad!! inapplicable. 
173, Wis, STAT. § 299.05(3) (1971). 
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provides that the debtor may appear on the return date and plead 
orally to the complaint.174 The issue of possession is then decided; 
the two-stage hearing procedure set out in Original A.B. 1057 is 
eliminated.175 The right to possession, however, is the only issue to 
be resolved;176 if the creditor wishes a money judgment, for either 
damages or deficiency, a second action must be brought. Of course, 
once judgment is entered, the creditor may always choose to enlist 
the sheriff's aid in taking possession of the collateral.177 The nego• 
tiators also recognized that unless the prejudgment repossession 
provisions and the right to cure provisions were related, an ad-
ditional eight-day delay would be encountered while the creditor 
waited for the debtor's right to cure to expire. Since they saw no 
purpose in such a delay, the negotiators provided that the creditor 
may bring his action for possession at any time after default, but 
that the return day may not be set prior to the expiration of the cure 
period.178 
Once bank representatives accepted the abolition of prejudgment 
repossession, the negotiators worked together with very little con-
flict in the development of this procedure. Their mutual satisfaction 
with the result was undoubtedly the key to the fact that second-stage 
negotiators never seriously objected to the over-all scheme. Only two 
notable changes were made at the second stage, neither of which 
affected the general approach to repossession. 
First, nearly all creditors were dissatisfied with the inability of 
the repossessing party to enter a dwelling. This requirement, they 
felt, would lead to the absurd result that household goods would 
have to be left out on the lawn before they could be repossessed. They 
. argued that the UCC breach-of-the-peace restriction170 effectively 
prevents violence, and that, even if it is not sufficient, the creditor 
should at least be able to enter a residence with the consent of the 
debtor. Consumer representatives, however, feared that the consent 
of the debtor might often be less than voluntary.180 They were willing 
174. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(1)(d). 
175. See text accompanying note 168 supra. If at this hearing neither party is able 
to establish a right to possession, which is possible since neither party is likely to be 
prepared to discuss sophisticated legal or factual questions, the matter would un• 
doubtedly be continued. In this instance, the WCA procedure would approximate that 
of Original A.B. 1057. 
176. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(1)(e). For a severe criticism of this policy, 
see Heiser, supra note 27, at -. 
177. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(5)(a). 
178. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(6), 
179. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 9-503. 
180. Consumer representatives believed that repossessors are often quite incon• 
November 1973] The Wisconsin Consumer Act 43 
to back down only to the extent that the repossessor be allowed to 
enter a residence at the "voluntary request" of the customer.181 This 
solution did not truly satisfy many creditors, but consumer repre-
sentatives were quite firm. They felt that once judgment is entered, 
most customers will peacefully give up the collateral.182 However, 
even if problems are created for creditors, consumer representatives 
felt that a repossessor should not be allowed to enter a dwelling 
under less than amicable circumstances unless a sheriff is present. 
The second change was made primarily at the suggestion of con-
sumer finance representatives and without much conflict. In the 
interest of reducing costs, a provision was added permitting the ac-
tion for possession to be commenced by an officer or agent of the 
creditor even though such person may not be an attomey.183 
Barring unforeseen difficulties, the scheme worked out in Wis-
consin should not have disastrous cost consequences.184 First, obtain-
ing judgment for possession need not, of itself, cause delay. Judgment 
may be obtained on the fifteenth day following notice of the right to 
cure, and collateral may be repossessed within the hour. Second, the 
costs of obtaining judgment, although hardly negligible, have been 
minimized, primarily by eliminating the need for an attorney. If 
the issue of possession can be settled at the hearing, as should nor-
mally be the case, the only cost increase will be that due to the added 
time spent by the employee in presenting the creditor's case. How-
ever, if the creditor has not received notice of the customer's defense, 
siderate of the interests of the debtor. For a collection of repossession cases, see Hogan, 
The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN. L. REv. 205, 
212 n.30 (1962). 
181. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.206(2). 
182. Where the customer has appeared to defend the action for possession and lost, 
this assumption is probably valid. However, having received notice of cure plus process 
regarding the action for possession will probably not soften very many debtors who 
would have otherwise objected to the repossessor's efforts. If these documents induce 
neither cure nor appearance at the hearing, they will probably just be added to the 
already large pile of notices the average debtor receives prior to repossession. Certainly, 
these documents should reduce the number of debtors who are surprised by repossession. 
However, I suspect that many uncooperative debtors are not at all surprised when the 
repossessor knocks at the door. 
183. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.205(l)(a). Unfortunately, since this section pro-
vides only that the action "may be commenced by" such a person, it is not clear 
whether the person is authorized to take a default or, when the debtor disputes the 
issue, to argue the creditor's case. This uncertainty remains to be settled through 
litigation or regulation. Presumably, the section was intended to make creditor at-
torneys entirely optional in such proceedings, and I assume that that will be its effect. 
184. Professor Johnson, in his extensive analysis of self-help automobile repossession 
in California, suggests that the costs of eliminating self-help repossession could be as 
much as 381 dollars per repossession. Johnson, supra note 122, at 34. However, his 
assumptions differ considerably from the circumstances under the WCA. See id. at 22. 
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.he will most likely be unprepared to ttleet any claims beyond ques-
tions regarding default and cure. In this instance, the matter is likely 
to be continued and will probably necessitate the emp1oytnellt of an 
attorney. Costs ate then likely to be considerable, hut they are 
cettainly justified. 
The soundness of the legislative decision to eliminate prejudg-
ment repossession turns ort whether the increased costs are balanced. 
by the societal benefit received. The benefit is si:tnply ~ function c,f 
the number of debtors that ,vill raise valid claims at the hearing on 
pbSsession. If, for exa:tnple, the cost of the average repossession is 
increased by thirty dollars and only one debtor in five hundred 
taises a valid daim, the decision made in the WCA will have beert 
wrong. While it is, of course, impossible to place a dollar value on 
the prevention df an improper repossession; fifteen thousand dollars 
seems too high a price. On the other hand, if fifty valid defenses are 
raised in five hundred actions for possession, the choice made by the 
negotiators was probably correct. Not only will a substantial number 
of improper repossessions have been prevented, but the industry 
practices giving rise to valid defenses should begin to change as welL 
There is a second, less significant factor to be considered in 
evaluating the legislative decision. If a substantial number of invalid 
defenses are raised, a possibility which has been suggested else, 
where,185 perhaps the system should be altered. The societal benefit 
received when an invalid defense is raised is minimal. Yet, a sub• 
stantial number of such claims could severely increase costs, par-
ticularly if the majority of these claims cannot be disposed of at 
the initial hearing. In my opinion, the probability that a meaningful 
number of debtors will raise valid defenses is not so small that 
refotm should not be attempted. However, the longevity of these 
teforins should rest in the hands of consumers. If a miniscule pro-
portion of valid defenses are raised, either creditor conduct is largely 
ptoper or the notice-and-oppottrtnity protections are not working. 
In either case, consumer advocates should be open to revision of the 
procedures. 
In contrast to the WCA, the UCCC suggests no limitations on 
the UCO repossession provisions. The Special Committee is ap• 
parerttly cortsidering a change, although it has made no recommen-
dation as yet. The UCCC Redraft states that sufficient time was not 
185. See id. at 33. See also R. DOLPHIN, AN ANALYSIS OF EcoNol\lIC AND PERSONAL 
FACTORS LEADING TC5 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 90-92 (1965); Kripke, supra note 46, at 
480-81 (discussirlg the story, "not often :publidzed by iegal aid bqreaus," of tl}c existence 
of "real deadbeats'). 
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available to atten1pt to resolve the adjustments that may be required 
by the evolving law following Sniadach,186 
The National Commission, on the other hand; suggests a pro-
cedure nearly identical to that found in the WCA.187 With "full 
understanding" that substantial rate increases and severely curtailed 
credit availability ate likely to occur, the Commission bases its 
recommendation on the concept "that an individual has the right to 
continued 'use and possession of property (free) from arbitrary en-
croachment.' "188 It suggests that "the tight ... to an opportunity' to 
be heard n1ust apply across the board, irrespective of the type of 
repossession-'-'self-help,' replevin, or whatever."189 
Although I may be guilty of oversinlplification, the Comitlissiort 
does not appear to be concerned with the possibility of increased 
rates or decreased credit availability, nor with the proportion of 
debtors who would actually benefit from notice and an opportttnity 
to be heard. Certainly Fuentes does not suggest that due process re-
quires such absolute disregard for the interests of the typical, paying 
consumer.190 Perhaps a presumption that the cost inctect5e will not 
be unduly burdensome is implicit i11 the Go111n1ission;s recommenda~ 
tion. 
4. Some Reflections 
The delay in the atcnial of tepdssession tights and the require-
ment that a judgment be obtained before repossession may well be 
among the greatest cost-impact areas of the WCA. The National 
186. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note, iv (Working Redraft No. 4, 
1972). 
187. In fact, the entire cure-repossession package recommended by the Commission 
is essentially the same as that of the WCA: 
At the time the creditor sends notice ,of the cure p_eriod (14 days), and prior to 
actual repossession (whether by replevin with_ the aid of state officers or by self-
help), hi! may simultatieously send ncitice bf the underlying claim against the 
debtor, and the debtor should be afforded ah opportunity to be heard in cotitt oh 
the merits of such claim. Such time period for an oppottuhity t6 be heard may run 
concurrently with the cure period. 
CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23; at 29. Moreover, the Commission's specific approval 
of the WCA summons as providing adequate notice of the pending claim suggests that 
the Commission may have been strongly influenced by the Wisconsin approach. See 
id. at 30. 
188. Id. at 30, quoting Fuentes v. Slievin, 407 U,S, 671 81 (1972). 
189. Id. at 30. 
190. Among the Fuentes Court's examples of circitmstances hi \vhich notice and 
hearing may be postponed are those cases in 1vhich the individual's interest is out-
'weighed by that of the public, such as seizures on behalf of the United States for llie 
collection of ta.xes, 407 U.S. at 91-92, citing Phillips v. Corlmiissiotier, 283 U.S. 589 
(1931), and preventing a bank failure, 407 U.~. at 92, citing Fahey v. Mallonee, 3ll2 U.S. 
i'!!> (1946), See White, supra note 16¾1 at 510, 
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Commission survey disclosed that "creditors thought the single most 
important remedy or contract provision in a secured consumer credit 
transaction was the right to take a security interest in the goods . . . 
and the concomitant right to r~possess if the debtor defaulted."101 
Although it was unable to predict the effects with any certainty, the 
Commission thought any restriction of these remedies would prob-
ably have a significant impact on rates and credit availability.102 
Prior to the WCA, the creditor was able to repossess a delinquent 
debtor's collateral as soon as he decided to do so. Under the WCA, 
the creditor must normally wait at least fifty-five days after the initial 
delinquency.193 Moreover, the creditor must wait at least eight days 
to obtain judgment even if his decision to repossess is made after the 
cure period has run.194 Therefore, the delays required by the WCA 
will run from a minimum of eight to as long as fifty-five days. 
In the case of automobiles, which depreciate at a significant rate, 
any delay in obtaining possession after the decision to repossess re-
sults in losses. Data from four of the creditors consulted by Professor 
Johnson in his study of automobile repossessions in California 
showed that 73.8 per cent of new-car and 75.3 per cent of used-car 
repossessions occur within sixty days after default in payment, and 
22.8 per cent of new-car and 17. 7 per cent of used-car repossessions 
occur within thirty days of default in payment.19G Professor Johnson 
also calculates the cost of delay, once the decision to repossess has 
been made, to be $2.70/day for new cars and $1.30/day for used 
cars.196 If these California figures are applicable to Wisconsin, the 
191. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 29-30. 
192. Id. at 30. 
193. Presuming that the debtor's payments are due monthly and no default other 
than nonpayment occurs, there is no default until the debtor is forty days delinquent 
(ten days delinquent on the second unpaid installment). If notice of right to cure is 
sent immediately, and if the action for possession is filed within seven days of the 
notice, the return date may be set on the day that the cure period runs out-fifteen 
days following notice of right of cure. Hence, judgment for possession may be obtained 
fifty-five days after the due date of the first unpaid installment. 
194. Of course, the creditor could file the action for possession before deciding to 
repossess, but this seems an unnecessary expense. See note 145 supra and accompanying 
text. It is not likely to become a common practice. 
The eight-day minimum predicted here is probably conservative. It assumes that 
the action can be filed immediately and that there will be no delay in taking the 
default. The practical minimum will probably be more like ten to twelve days. 
195. Johnson, supra note 122, at 6. Default here means the default that stimulated 
the repossession. This is rarely the first default. As suggested above, see note 154 supra, 
creditors often try to work out a new arrangement with a defaulting debtor before 
resorting to repossession. According to Professor Johnson, the national work-out to 
repossession ratio is 2.8/1. Johnson, supra, at 9. 
196. Professor Johnson estimates the depreciation cost over thirty days to average 
$57 for new cars and $31 for used cars, Johnson, supra note 122, at 34, Further, he 
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minimum delay loss on a new car will be twenty-one dollars and 
more than twenty per cent of the new car repossessions (those de-
layed as much as nventy-five days) will result in losses in excess of 
sixty-five dollars per car.197 Since five to ten per cent of all automobile 
contracts ultimately end in repossession,198 the cost impact of the 
WCA provisions will be appreciable. 
As mentioned above, one of the most seriously affected creditor 
groups, the manufacturer-affiliated automobile finance companies, 
did not participate in the WCA negotiations. Their absence was par-
ticularly significant in the drafting of the provisions that increase the 
costs of repossessing collateral. One negotiator told me that through-
out these discussions there was a feeling that this was really "their 
issue" and that at any moment they would show up to present their 
point of view. They never did. It is impossible, of course, to deter-
mine precisely what modifications would have been made if the auto-
mobile finance companies had participated. Their interests were 
represented in many respects by the banks, which formed what was 
probably the most influential creditor group in the negotiations. On 
the other hand, the passage of the bill was always in doubt, and the 
automobile financers could probably have exacted some meaningful 
concessions in exchange for their support. ·1 doubt that they could 
have effected significant changes in the repossession procedure. The 
consumer representatives were adamant on the elimination of non-
judicial repossession, and the procedure could not have been stream-
lined much more than it was. However, the automobile financers 
might well have reduced the periods of delay in the accrual of re-
possession rights. Perhaps they could have obtained a more stringent 
definition of subsequent defaults-that is, default after having cured 
once or, perhaps, twice. Quite possibly they could have obtained 
estimates opportunity cost-the cost due to the loss of the use of the funds the creditor 
would have received but for the delay-to average $24 for new cars and $8 for used 
cars for thirty days. Id. These totals work out to $2.70 per day for new cars and $1.30 
per day for used cars. But see White, supra note 164, at 521 n.54, where Professor White 
suggests that these costs should be scaled down to monthly rates of $68 for new cars 
and $32 for used cars. 
197. Of course, during the delay the creditor will continue his efforts to induce 
payment. He may well be aided in this effort by the WCA in that the creditor is now 
permitted to engage in the otherwise unconscionable collection practice of sending 
official looking documents and legal process to the debtor. See note 142 supra. Before 
this practice was generally banned, it was presumably effective. To the extent the 
debtor makes payment, and, hence, to the extent the creditor would otherwise have 
repossessed too early, all parties benefit. Reduction of such premature repossessions is, 
of course, the goal of consumer advocates. Moreover, to the extent that such reposses-
sions are prevented, not only is unfairness decreased, but delay losses are reduced. It 
seems unlikely, however, that such gains would approximate the losses. 
198. Johnson, supra note 122, at 13. 
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additional exigent-circumstance exceptions to the right to cure. At 
any rate, the absence of this substantial credit group was un-
doubtedly a significant factor in determining the ultimate scope of 
theWCA 
C. Restrictions ori Security Interests 
The case of Willidms v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.100 is a 
classic; if not typical, exampie of how the unrestricted availability of 
cohsumer ptbperty as security can be abused. 1n that case the stan-
dardized conditional sales tontract used by appel1ee retail furniture 
store contained an add-on security dause. As long as the customer 
maintained an accouht the outstanding balance of which had never 
been zero, any debt incurred by the purchase of goods on credit was 
secured by ail gdods previously purchased by that customer on credit. 
In I 962, the appellant, a 1ong-time customer of the store, had re-
duced her ba1artce to 164 dollars. She then purchased a 515-dollar 
steteo and defaulted shortly thereafter. The store obtained a replevin 
judgment for all items purchased from it by the appellant since 
1957. Ort grouhds :hot solely related to the add-on clause, the appel-
late court heid that the transaction could be found to be uncon-
scionable.200 
Rather than relying solely on unconscionabi1ity clauses, modern 
consumer-credit legislation usually contains specific restrictions on 
the taking of security interests. A key presumption running through-
out such legislation fa that there is nothing abusive about taking a 
purchase-money security interest, that is, a security interest in an 
item the purchase of which was facilitated by the extension or 
credit.201 There is also Substantial agreement among draftsmen con-
cerning the treatment of security interests in credit sales. However, 
no such general agreement exists as to the restrictions applicable to 
security interests in loans. 
The Wisconsin negotiations over restrictions on security interests 
199. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
200. The court held tliat1 in light of all the circumstantes, the ttial cotttt could 
refuse to etlforce the contract if it found it to be uncoI1Stionab1e under scctidti !!•SU!! 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Among the conttibuting circumstances, in additioh 
to the oppressive security interest, were that the customer was on relief and supporting 
seven children on a monthly stipend of 218 dollars artd that the customer's fimtntlal 
situation was well known to the salesman. 350 F.2d at 448. 
201. Put another ivay, the risk of losing the item purchased can hardly outweigh 
the value bf the credit that mad~ its acquisition possible. Obviously, and less obliquely, 
if the ctistbmer needs a refrigerator, the risk of losing it to repossession cannot be so 
great that he should be prohibited ftoin ol:ltaining it. JJut see MoDEt CoNsUMlllt Ctti:ntl' 
ACT §§ 2.411(2)(b), .411(4)(a), discussed in notes 215-16 infra, 
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for the most part paralleled. these general trends. Ifowever, they were 
quite complex because of the diverse interests involved; even a quite 
flarrow prohibition oii the taking of a patticti1ar type of collateral 
could have a trushirtg impact o:ri businessmen who rely heavily o:ri 
that type. Even though consumer advocates felt that the taking of 
excessive security interests could be a severe abuse, they were also 
aware that thete was a real danger of being overprotective. 
I. Credit Sales 
The draftsmen of consumer-credit legislation generally agree that 
a retail seller or indirect sales financer should not be able to look to 
the general property of the debtor for security unless the goods sold 
or services rendered bear some special relationship to the property 
in which a security interest is to be taken. Presumably, this view is 
based on the theory that if the goods sold are not sufficiently valuable 
in themselves to secure the extension of credit1 a customer whose 
personal creditworthiness cannot support the extension of credit 
ought not to make the purchase.202 A special relationship is generaily 
found where the goods soid or the services rendered. are closely con-
nected to the property taken and the debt secured is substantia1,203 
and in add-on sales. 
Original A.B. 1057 provided that a dose connection exists where 
the goods sold are installed upon or annexed to other goods or to 
land, or where land is maintained, repaired, or improved as a result 
of the sale of the goods or services,204 This formulation was satisfac-
tory to all Wisconsin negotiators. Differences arose, however, as to 
when a debt is sufficiently substantial to justify a security interest in 
closely connected property. · 
Under Original A.B. 1057, a debt was sufficiently substantial, in 
the case of a security interest in realty, if it exceeded 3,000 dollars 
or, in the case of a security interest in goods, if it exceeded 500 dol-
lars.205 First-stage negotiators were not overly concerned with this 
provision. Neither banks nor large retaiiers regularly take nonpur-
202. Examples of goods or services that have little vaiue as collateral are cosmetics, 
books, darlcing lessons, kitchenware, and lieaith club memberships. Marty of these are 
commonly the subject of door-to-door sales, which have received much attention of 
late. See Sher, The "Cooling-Off' Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. R.Ev. 717, 
721-24 (1968). 
203. The "closely connected-substantial debt" terminology is taken from UNIFORM 
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 2-407, Comment 1. 
204. A.B. 1057, § 422.416(5). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.416(5). 
205. A.B. 1057, § 422.416(5). See NATIONAL CbNsUME!t Act § 2.416(5). The MCCA 
retains these limits. See MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr §§ 2.411(2)(c)-(d). 
50 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:1 
chase-money security interests in credit sales. However, banks occa-
sionally buy home improvement paper, which is normally secured 
by an interest in the improved realty. Such transactions rarely exceed 
3,000 dollars, and bank representatives warned that credit for smaller 
home improvements would be restricted if the creditor could not 
take a security interest in the house. The consumer representatives' 
view was that the customer should never be required to risk losing 
his home unless the creditor has facilitated a substantial improve-
ment of the property. There was, however, no rational way to define 
a "substantial improvement." Convinced that many legitimate home 
improvement transactions would be restricted by the provision as it 
stood, consumer adyocates agreed to reduce the obligation require-
ment from 3,000 dollars to 2,000 dollars. 
At second-stage negotiations, savings and loan representatives 
and, of course, home-improvement concerns were adamant about a 
further reduction at least to 1,000 dollars.206 Consumer representa-
tives were quite reluctant to reduce the requirement any further, 
feeling that a 1,000-dollar transaction would not necessarily result 
in a substantial improvement to the home. However, political con-
siderations prevailed. Convinced that they must compromise to ob-
tain the support of the savings and loan companies, consumer 
representatives agreed at the last minute to reduce the requirement 
to 1,000 dollars. 
Although the issue was discussed, no negotiating group seriously 
argued for a reduction of the 500-dollar requirement for security 
interests in closely connected goods. One negotiator told me that the 
only transactions in the 300- to 500-dollar range that they felt might 
benefit other goods were substantial repair work on automobiles 
or boats. Although repairmen were not represented in negotiations, 
they are substantially protected by mechanics' lien laws. 
The result reached in Wisconsin is very similar to the UCCC 
provisions. The only difference is that the UCCC requires only a 
300-dolla:r debt207 (as compared to a 500-dollar debt208) before a 
security interest in closely connected goods is allowed. Both require 
a debt of 1,000 dollars in the case of a security interest in realty.200 
The National Commission, on the other hand, appears to take a 
206. To a lesser degree, consumer finance companies were also concerned, since they 
occasionally buy home-improvement paper. 
207. UNIFOro.l CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.407(1), 
208. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422,417(l)(b). 
209. UNIFORM CoNSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 2.407(1); Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422,417 
(l)(c). 
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different view. While it is not entirely clear that the Commission 
considered the matter thoroughly or that it intended its recommen-
dation to reach so far,210 apparently it would never allow the seller 
to take a nonpurchase-money security interest. This recommenda-
tion seems much too facile, especially with regard to security in-
terests in land. Notwithstanding the notorious practices of the 
home-improvement industry,211 a legitimate builder who significantly 
improves the value of the debtor's home should not be expected to 
rely solely on the debtor's credit rating. 
The second special relationship in which the WCA allows non-
purchase-money security interests in a credit sale is found in add-on 
sales-that is, where a seller has obtained a security interest in the 
property of the customer as a result of a prior credit sale and now 
wishes to secure a subsequent sale to the same customer with the 
previously obtained interest. In astounding unanimity, the WCA, 
the MCCA, the DCCC, and the National Commission all permit the 
seller to secure the second debt212 in this way-with certain restric-
tions to prevent the interminable piling-up of security interests 
found in Williams.213 The matter was not a contested issue in 
Wisconsin. 
210. The Commission simply states that "the creditor should not be allowed to 
take a security interest in goods or property of the debtor other than the goods or 
property which are the subject of the sale," with the exception of add-on sales. CoM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 27. Perhaps the Commission does not consider one 
who renders service a seller, or it might consider the connected property to be part of 
the subject of the sale. At any rate, this short statement is not typical of the Com-
mission Report in either its lack of clarity or its apparent oversimplification of the 
problem. 
211. See, e.g., Mathews v. Aluminum Acceptance Corp., 1 Mich. App. 570, 137 
N.W.2d 280 (1965); Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 
186 (1964). 
212. Wisconsin Consumer Act §§ 422.418(1)-(2); MODEL CoNSUMER CREDIT Ac:r § 2.412 
(l); UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.408; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 27. 
The only differences in approach are that the WCA and the MCCA allow add-on secu-
rity interests only if the two obligations are consolidated into one, whereas the UCCC 
and the Commission Report contain no such requirement. Hence, the WCA to some 
extent coerces the consolidation of multiple obligations. It probably has little impact, 
however, since the WCA goes to great lengths to insure that consolidations do not result 
in greater expense to the customer, Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.206, and the added 
expense to the creditor in consolidating the t.110 obligations should be minimal. Never-
tlleless, such coercion seems unnecessary. 
213. Payments received on the two debts are deemed to pay the finance charges 
first and then the prior debt. When the first debt is deemed to have been paid off in 
this manner, the prior security interests are terminated. :For example, suppose a debtor 
has, an existing obligation of 300 dollars, which is secured by a purchase-money interest 
in a refrigerator. If he then buys a stereo on credit from the same merchant, both 
obligations may be secured by both the refrigerator and the stereo. However, when 
the payments on both obligations total 300 dollars plus the finance charges, the security 
interest in the refrigerator is terminated. For a mild dissenting view regarding the 
soundness of this scheme, see Kripke, supra note 46, at 474-75. 
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2. Consumer Loans 
The general philosophical agreement in the area of security 
foterests in credit sales does not exist in the loan field; the WCA, 
the MCCA, the UCCC, and the National Commission take widely 
variant positions on this subject. 
Original AB. I 057 prohibited securing a consumer loan with a 
nonpurchase-money security interest in (I) real property, where the 
amount :financed is 3,000 dol1ars or less;214 (2) personal property, the 
fair market value of which exceeds one and one-half times the 
amount :financed;215 or (3) "household furnishings, appliances [ or] 
clothing of the customer and his dependents."216 At first-stage nego-
tiations, the bartks were concerned. about the first two prohibitions. 
Initially, and without great difficulty, they convinced consumer rep-
resentatives that the second iimitation was unworkable and counter-
productive. They argued that it would require an appraisal of the 
value of the would-be collateral and that the cost of this appraisal 
would be passed on to the customer. In addition, the banks main-
tained. that this restriction would severely affect debt-consolidation 
loans, in which the creditor normally relies on all avai1able col-
lateral. Consumer representatives agreed to eliminate the second 
restriction chiefly because they believed that consumers often benefit 
froIIl debt consolidation loans,217 
The negotiations concerning security interests in real ptoperty 
followed a pattern similar to that followed ih the case of sales. '.Be-
cause a number of Milwaukee banks were in the practice of making 
loans for the construction of residential garages, bank representa• 
tives sought a reduction in the loan-size requirement. They pointed 
out that if the 3,000-dollar limit remained, banks would rately be 
214. A.B. 1057, § 422.416(3)(a). See NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 2.416(3)(a), 
'the MCCA has retained this restnction, adding the requirement that the credit be 
extended "for the purpose of the substantial improvement of the real property." 
MoDEL CoNSUMER CREDIT Acr § 2.411(2)(d). 
215. A.B. 1057, § 422.416(3)(b). See NATIONAL CONSUJIIER Acr § 2.416(3)(b), 
The MCCA has expanded this restriction by making it also applicable to purchase-
money security interests and by adding a prohibition of security interests in "tools of 
the trade of the consumer not exceeding a fair market value of five hundred dol• 
Jars •.•• " MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT Acr § 2.411(4)(a). 
216. A.B. 1057, § 422,416(2). NATIONAL CONSUJIIER Arrr § 2.416(2), 
The MCCA has expanded this restriction by prohibiting purchase-money as well ns 
nonpurchase-money security interests and by adding "personal effects" to the list. 
MoDEL CONSUMER CREDIT Arrr § 2.411(2)(b). These provisions are applicable to all 
consumer-credit transactions. 
217. For a suggestion that the provision is probably meaningless since few borrowers 
have personal property suitable for use as collateral, see Moo, supra note lo, at 453 
n.69. 
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able to secure thejr loans. Yet, few custoJners would qu<!-1.ify for lq<P.J.s 
of the size needed to construct a garage if the loan could p.ot 'be 
secured by the realty, Consumer representatives were again :fac;ed 
with a line-dra·wing problem .arising from thej.r 'belief that~ debtor's 
realty should be substantially improved before he risks the lp~s o~ 
his home. Unable to establish that a debtor's realty could not be 
substantially improved for less than 3,000 dollars, they agreed, at the 
end of first-stage negotiations, to reduce the reqqirement to 2,000 
dollars. 
By far the most influep.tial voice at second-stage negotiatim1s on, 
security interests in loans was that of the consumer financ;:e com-
panies. Since the great bulk. of their business consists of cl.irect con-
l!UJD.er loans, the issue was critical to them. The finance coJnp<J.11-ie,s, 
as well as the banks, were still cijssatisfied with the 2,000-doUar- lofl.P.-
size requirement for sec:urity interests in realty, Both institutjop.s 
make loans in tile 1,300- to J,500,dollar range that are :i<;:c:ured by 
realty, ap.d tp.ey were :rwt cJ.IP{ious to chap.ge their prnctices, Mother 
source of pressure came froJD, the fact that the savings anp. lo,:'!-n 
assoc:iations and the banks sought a simile!! reduction ip. th,e c::i.se of 
credit sales, In light of their "substantial improvement" philosophy, 
consumer representatives would have been hard pressed to jmt~fy 
~eating security interests in sales and Joans differently. Cpnse-
quently, they reluctantly :'!-greed, ::is a result of the :;evere press1,1re 
from all sides, tp p,1rt4er redµce the loan-size requireJI!ent tp J,0Q0 
dollars.218 
By comparison, the National Commission makes no recommet1~ 
dation as to restricting real property ,security interests pn lo.c!-Ils,219 
while the DCCC restricts seq1rity interests in real property op_ loans 
only where the finance charge exceed$ eighteen per cent per year 
and the loan is 1,000 dollars or less,220 The rationale for restricting 
security interests on loans less severely than those on sales is far from. 
clear. However, i~ doubtless depends on how the problem is per-
ceived, Certainly, the sales ap.d loans b1,1sinesses are quite different 
from one another, and the most notoriously abusive practices have 
occurred in the case of sales. (There is no such thing as a high,-pre:;-
sure door-to-door lender.) However, the fact that the customer might 
lose his home as a result of a relatively small purchase is apparently 
seen as a danger from which the c:ons1J,mer should pe protected, That 
g1s. See Wisconsiµ. Cqnsumer ,Act ~ 4~2,4i7(3)(b). · 
219. Presumably, the Commission's silence on this issue is a recommendation that 
there be no such restrictions. 
220. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3.501(3), .510. 
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danger hardly seems to be decreased by the fact that the funds used 
to make the purchase were obtained from a direct lender or were 
obtained at a rate of eighteen per cent or less. Moreover, since direct 
lenders rarely take real property security on smaller loans, there is 
little likelihood that any important source of credit will be curtailed 
as a result of further restrictions.221 Hence, there seems to be little 
justification for failing to restrict the few direct lenders who do en-
gage in this practice. 
The second major concern of the consumer finance companies 
regarding security interests on loans was the prohibition on taking 
household goods. The common practice of Wisconsin finance com-
panies had been to secure many of their consumer loans by taking 
an interest in all of the household goods owned by the customer. 
Although they admittedly repossessed such collateral only in rare 
circumstances, the finance companies believed that taking such secu-
rity interests significantly increases the debtor's incentive to repay 
the obligation. Hence, the prospect of the total unavailability of such 
collateral was a matter of great concern. 
Consumer advocates were ambivalent, since this is an area where 
serious abuses are common, yet the danger of overprotection is par-
ticularly great. They strongly believed that special protection should 
be provided for those items truly necessary to a minimum standard 
of living;222 since household furnishings and the like rarely have any 
significant resale value, they were not considered to be legitimate 
collateral. Consumer representatives realized, however, that some 
household goods do have significant resale value and saw no reason 
why the consumer should not be able to borrow against such prop-
erty as long as his livelihood was not endangered. Eventually, the two 
groups were able to agree on a list of specific household necessities 
that were made unavailable to the direct lender unless the proceeds 
of the loan were used to purchase the items.223 Notably available 
221. One might imagine a hypothetical debtor who is in dire need of 500 dollars 
and whose credit rating is such that he can only obtain such a sum by mortgaging his 
house. The 'Wisconsin restrictions on security interests on loans would certainly work 
to his disadvantage. However, I think this is likely to be a very rare case, and if it 
were to occur, the debtor, by putting up his house, could probably borrow 1,000 dollars 
and avoid the limitation. 
222. Put more paternalistically, the debtor should not be allowed to risk loss of 
household necessities in order to obtain loans for the purchase of what is likely to be 
less essential property. 
223. Wisconsin Consumer Act § 422.417(3)(c). The list includes clothing, dining 
table and chairs, refrigerator, heating stove, cooking stove, radio, beds, bedding, couch 
and chairs, cooking utensils, and kitchenware. 
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for use as collateral are televisions, stereos, freezers, washers, dryers, 
pianos, organs, antiques, boats, outboard motors, snowmobiles, and 
cars. Although some consumers may consider their television to be 
more important than their dining table, the adamant position taken 
by the finance company representatives forced the exclusion of items 
not essential to a most basic existence, especially when the item is 
likely to have significant resale value. 
In retrospect, both consumer and finance company representa-
tives seem content with the accord reached. While the debtor need 
not fear sleeping on the floor, the creditor may take a security in-
terest in enough of the debtor's property to provide the psychological 
impetus considered so important by the finance companies.224 
The National Commission, by way of contrast, apparently does 
not consider the use of household items as collateral to be a justi-
fiable practice. Notwit~tanding the heavy creditor reliance on such 
security interests in some cases, the Commission recommends that no 
creditor be allowed to take a nonpurchase-money security interest in 
household goods. Stating simply that the right, in the event of de-
fault, to repossess household goods has "far too disruptive an impact 
on the family life of the debtor to be in the public interest," the 
Commission makes no further distinction between necessities and 
nonnecessities. 225 
In my opinion, the Commission's position is too simplistic. While 
I would perhaps expand the WCA list of necessities, 226 and while it 
is not entirely clear what the Commission would include in the cate-
gory of household goods, it seems to me that the debtor should have 
the opportunity to decide how disruptive the loss of his piano or 
antique desk would be, and to weigh that risk against the value of a 
loan he might otherwise be unable to obtain. Also, the Commis-
sion's position is curious in light of its recommendations regarding 
realty. Whereas the consumer is not allowed to borrow 500 dollars 
against his piano, he can grant a mortgage on his house. Surely the 
disruption attendant to a foreclosure action would exceed that re-
sulting from repossession of a piano. 
224. One finance company representative told me that he thinks that the items 
available to the lender are the ones that the average debtor cares most about and are 
likely to provide more psychological impetus than the furniture or pots and pans. 
225. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 27. 
226. Compare the items classified as necessities in a different context (prejudgment 
attachment) by the California supreme court: television sets, refrigerators, stoves, sewing 
machines, and furniture of all kinds. Randone v. Appellate Dept. of the Super. Ct., 
5 Cal. 3d 536, 560, 488 P.2d HI, 29, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 725 (1971). 
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D. Jl.estricticms on Deficiencies and Volunt4ry Surrender 
When the secured creditor repossesses and disposes of collateral, 
the sale price is typically well below the outstanding balance of the 
account. To the extent that the sal~ price is insufficient to cover the 
debt plus allowable costs, the customer normally remains obligated 
to the creditor. This obligation is termed a "deficiency," and the 
judgment thereon is a "deficiency judgment.'' Great controversy 
has ragei:l of late as to whether a~d to what extent deficiencies in the 
consumer setting should be restricted. The matter was no less con-
troversial in Wisconsin. 
What, then, is ·wrong with allowing the creditor to collect con-
sumer deficiencies? The theory underlying deficiencies is simple and 
has a good deal of appeal. The customer has undertaken an obliga-
tion that he ought to repay in full. If the proceeds from enforcing 
a security interest exceed the amount owed, the creditor must remit 
the excess to the debtor. By the same token, if the proceeds do not 
satisfy the obligation, the debtor should be required to make up the 
difference. The critical flaw in this analysis is that this fifty-fifty 
model is a mirage; the deficiency is the only result that in fact oc-
curs.221 Very simply, the amount of the deficiency all too often seems 
unjustifiably large in light of the circumstances.2ll8 
Suppose, for example, that a debtor borrows 1,200 dollars to buy 
a stove, a refrigerator, and a living room set, the debt to be paid off 
in two years at a yearly interest rate of eighteen per cent. The initial 
balance, including finance charge, would be approximately 1,440 
dollars, and the monthly payments, about 60 dollars. After making 
payments for eight months, the debtor would have reduced the 
balance to about 850 dollars after deducting a HO-dollar rebate for 
unearned interest. If the debtor then defaults, repossession would 
yield a deficiency of 500 dollars (assuming the resale value of the 
used goods to be 400 dollars and repossession and storage costs to be 
50 dollars229), This surely would seem onerous to a debtor who has 
already paid 480 dollars and has an empty kitchen and living room. 
227. In Professor Shuchman's study of eighty-three automobile repossessions in 
Connecticut, only one resale price exceeded the creditor's claim (including cost of sale) 
against the debtor. Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile 
Repossession ar,d Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20, 62-65 (1969). 
228. The deficiency judgment reached the zenith of its potential absurdity in Im-
perial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. City Ct, 1963). 
The customer bought an automobile battery for $35.00, paid the dept iiown to SU.'75, 
and defaulted. When the dust cleared, he 1vas withQut bat~ery or car aqd faced wiili !l 
deficiency of $128.00. See generally Shucpman, Profit on Default: An Archival St~,ly 
of Automobile Repossession and Resal~, 22 STAN, L, REv. ~O (1969). 
229. This figure is probably conservative, Compare Imperial Discount Corp. v, 
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Presuming thc}.t t;h!:l initial sales price, the resale price, and the 
costs assessed were a.JI fair, the size of the qeficiency cannot be said 
to be the foult of eitp.er the debtor or the creditor. Rather, this 
situati,:;>n seems µn£,air pri1mrrily beqmse the creditor received so 
little for the ne4rly new gooq.s.231> The unfairness is magnified where 
t;he repossessed coJlatera,l ii; sold for less than its fair market value, 
as is too often the case.231 If the d~btor priginally paid an inflated 
price for the goods, the resale will cancel an even smaller portion 
of his obligation. 
Tl!ere an: those w4o argue232 for a complete return to the com-
~on law doctrine that the, 6-eq.itor not p~ 4llowed to looi t<;> poth 
the debt arn;l the ~ollateral~ b.ut must elect one or ~e other.233 Tliey 
apparently recllion that deficiency Judgments 11re generally so oppres-
sive that they i,hould not ]:Je pen:p.itteq. regardless of any advers~ 
impact on costs or credit ayailabiUty that might result from their 
prohibition, However, this approacp. ignores the ppssibility that c;ol-
lecting deficiep._cies migqt in sm:p.e cases be reasonab\e. If so, the CQ!it 
of eliminating those deficiencies should not be borne by t.µe paying 
customer. 
I should npte that the complete elimjnµ,tioI1 of deµciencies makes 
sense if the over-all creditor succei,s i:q. c91lecting deficiencies is min, 
imal. In that cc}.Se creditor -,resi5tap.ce to eliminating deficiencies is 
jJ.Jst much ado a,boµt p.othing, anq e~ort§ to gefip.e intricate limita-
tions woiild not be worthwhile. Hq\vever, based on the vigorous 
creditor opposition to restrictions on deficiencie,s, ap.d on my own 
edectic experience,234 I suspect that this is not the case. Although no 
qefj.nitive infon:p.11tipn is av<1-ilable,23!i this suspicion is bolstered some-
what by Professor Shµchman. His excellent stµqy of automobile 
deficiency judgments in Connectictit suggests that in over half of the 
deficiency judgments taken the creditor appears to collect,286 Of 
Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. City Ct. 1963), where costs for re• 
pogse!jsion, storage, and s11Ie of an autolj'.lQbile were 150 dollars. 
230. Adding to the disillusionment of at least some debtors is the fact that over 
21> per cent of the payments made by the debtor weq.t to pay finance charges. 
231. See text accompanying nqtes 261-63 infra. 
23ll. See, e.g., Clark, ~upra note 14, at 3~9, 
233, See 2 G-. GILMORE, supra note 119, at 1185-88. 
234. In information supplied by nine Wisconsin banks, the f!Sti~ated pre-WC!\ 
success in collecµng deficiencies ranged from 10 to 50 per cent, wjtb. most 'esti~at~ 
falling into the 15 to 20 per cent range. 
235. Perhaps some of the National Conp:nissioi;i studies will be helpful. 
236. Shuchmaµ1 ~upra note 2~8, ~t 38. 
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course, most of the time no deficiency judgment is sought,237 either 
because it is not necessary or because it is not worthwhile. 
The two reforms generally proposed are that deficiencies on 
smaller obligations be prohibited and that the method of calculating 
deficiencies be altered. A third, and very volatile, issue is whether 
deficiencies arising from credit sales should be treated differently 
from those arising from consumer loans. 
I. Elimination of Deficiencies on Smaller Obligations 
Why eliminate deficiencies on smaller obligations?238 Where the 
value of the collateral is very small the objective is clear: If the cost 
of repossession, storage, and disposal is comparable to the sale price 
of the collateral, the repossession will not reduce the debt signif-
icantly.239 As long as the costs do not exceed the resale price, the 
creditor loses nothing, but the loss to the debtor may be significant. 
Although the creditor stands to gain little through repossession, he 
has a powerful coercive tool. Hence, where collateral has little re-
sale value, repossession is primarily a means for harassment.240 
Certainly, the law should not condone such conduct. 
The water muddies, however, as the size of the obligations in 
which a deficiency is denied becomes larger. If the collateral is sold 
for its actual value and if its value is not eaten up by the costs, why 
should the creditor be forced to choose between the collateral and 
a money judgment? The answer to this question turns on a judg-
ment regarding who should absorb the loss when the resale value 
of the goods is substantially less than the original purchase price.241 
If the burden of deficiencies is shifted to the creditor, the pri-
mary impact will probably be on the motor vehicle market. The 
vast majority of repossessions take place in this market because mo-
237. The National Commission study of deficiency suits in the District of Columbia 
showed that "there were only two deficiency suits for every nine repossessions." John• 
son, supra note 122, at 43. 
238. Advocates of this action are not entirely in accord on the rationale for elimi• 
nating such deficiencies. See Kripke, supra note 46, at 477. 
239. See Jordan &: Warren, supra note 46, at 441. For e.xample, if the cost of re• 
possessing, storing, and disposing of the debtor's refrigerator is 50 dollars and its 
sale brings only 75 dollars, the debt is reduced by only 25 dollars, and the debtor has 
lost his refrigerator. That the debtor could theoretically avoid this result by selling 
the collateral himself is no answer. First, the creditor would probably try to prevent 
the debtor from disposing of the collateral, and, second, as a practical matter, debtors 
in distress rarely take advantage of the steps available to them. See Shuchman, supra 
note 228, at 36-38 (74 of the 78 deficiency judgments studied were obtained by default), 
240. See H. KRIPKE, supra note 7, at 297. 
241. See Kripke, supra note 46, at 478. Of course, if the value of the goods has not 
dropped substantially, the election subjects the creditor to little hardship. 
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tor vehicles are the only common consumer personalty with any ap-
preciable resale value. Professor Shuchman's study of eighty-three 
automobile deficiency suits showed that the average deficiency was 
approximately 600 dollars.242 If his figures are typical of deficiencies 
where no suit is filed, and if creditors succeed in collecting fifteen 
per cent of their deficiencies,243 the complete prohibition of defi-
ciencies could result in losses of roughly 90 dollars per repossession. 
In order to reduce these losses, creditors could either avert defi-
ciencies to the extent possible or increase interest rates and retail 
prices. But brisk competition between creditors and retailers in most 
states for the automobile dollar would tend to make price and rate 
increases a secondary creditor response. Instead, creditors would 
probably restrict the availability of credit to the higher risk cus-
tomer. However, since even careful screening will never completely 
eliminate the need for deficiencies,244 price and rat~ increases are 
certainly possible. 
If this analysis is correct, the impact of restricting deficiencies 
will be visited primarily on the high-risk automobile purchaser. He 
will be required to make a down payment sufficient to cover the 
initial depreciation, to buy a cheaper car, or, in markets where no 
down payment is required, to forgo the purchase entirely. This re-
sult is appealing in that the class of consumers sought to be protected 
-that is, the class most likely to default-is also the class that pays 
for most of the protection. On closer analysis, however, this is still 
a case of one person paying for the protection of another. Since no 
creditor can identify with certainty who will and who will not de-
fault, he must simply restrict credit to the customers that he con-
siders most marginal. Within that group, some would have defaulted 
and some would not. To those customers who would othenvise have 
defaulted but do not because they bought a cheaper car, and to those 
who still default but without the possibility of a deficiency, the 
added protection is a boon. The price of that protection has been 
paid by the customer who would not have defaulted, but whose 
credit was restricted. 
How can this benefit be weighed against this burden? With 
242. The average net total claim was 1,416 dollars, and the average first resale 
price was 806 dollars. This results in an average deficiency of 610 dollars. Shuchman, 
supra note 228, at 62-65. 
243. See note 234 supra. 
244. The most common causes of default are loss of job, overextension, illness, and 
family break-up. COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 23, at 43. Most of these cannot be 
predicted at the time credit is extended. 
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certainty, it CiUlnQt; yet I am astonished at how many consumer 
a,cl.vo(;ates seem so certain that deficiencies should be restricted. 
Neye~:theless1 with some hesitation, J side with them for a number 
of reasops. 
First, defo::iencies are a tremendous burden on the individual-
not only on the individual who pays, but on the individual who doi::s 
I1Qt. The burden is not only financi<!l; it is also emotional. Defi-
<;iencies nearly alw4ys seem unduly large to the customer; it is no 
help to tell him that the charges and resale price were legitimate. 
To be deluged for months by letters and phone calls demanding the 
payment Qf what seems to be an unjust debt is a severe drain, 
Secol}d, the argument, commonly made by creditors, that the 
party at fault should bear the burden is not appropriate. In most 
cases, the concept of fault has no place in a discussion of consumer 
default because the causes of default are largely out of the debtor's 
control.245 
If deficiencies on smaller obligations are to be eliminated, two 
basic issues must be resolved: first, the obligation size below which 
deficiencies may not be collected, and second, whether to base this 
cutoff point on the size of the initial obligation or on the size of the 
obligation at the time of the default, A thircl issue, which was con-
sidered briefly in Wisconsin, is whether special consideration should 
be given to the portion of the original obligation that has been paid 
<1-t the time of default. 
Original AB. I 057 provided that where the creditor repossesses, 
the customer is liable for the outstmding balance only if (a) the un-
paid balance at the time of defaqlt is 2,000 dollars or more, and (b) 
the customer h<!,s paid less than one third of the deferred payment 
pric~.246 Since these provisions significantly affect automobile fi-
nancing, the negotiatio;ns between bank and consumer representa-
tives were arduous. In contrast, national retailers, who rarely 
repossess, were largely unconcerned. 
!i?45, The only common reason for default that is substantially within the debtor's 
control is overextension. See note 244 supra. However, this is also within the control 
of the creditor. Default due to overextension works to the detriment of everybody, yet 
its frequency indicates that neither debtors nor creditors have paid sufficient attention 
to the problem. Of course, to force creditors to be more concerned about overextension 
is to take away, to some extent, the debtor's ability to make his own decisions as to 
what he can and cannot afford, This is regrettaJ>le, but clearly too many debtors have 
beep. m_aking poor decisions. In my view, some additional concern on the part of tl).e 
credit community is not unwarranted. 
246. A.B. 1057, § 425.211. The corresponding provision of the NCA (section 5,211) 
did not include th~ reqtJirement that le~ than one third of the obligation have been 
p!lid, +he l'),!CCA would simply eliminate:: deficiencjcs altogether. See MoDEL CoN~Ul.Jf:R 
CREDIT Acr § 7.208(1). 
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According to the draftsmen of the NCA, the "major concern" 
of the legitimate creditor is the consumer who defaults on an early 
payment, leaving used collateral and a substantial unpaid balance,247 
Apparently1 the elimination of deficiencies where more than one 
third of the amount financed is paid reflected this concern. While 
creditor representatives were ·willing to discuss restrictions on cred-
itors in areas of great consumer interest1 the converse position, that 
creditor remedies be available only in areas of "major creditor con-
cern/' was totally unacceptable and even posed a threat to future 
negotiations. In addition, the banks argued that it would be irra-
tional and arbitrary to allow a debtor to escape liability for a defi-
ciency regardless of the obligation size once he has paid one third 
of the obligation. Consumer representatives relented rather quickly. 
The true clash came on the questions of obligation size and cut-
off point. In the hypothetical case discussed at the beginning of this 
section, the original amount financed was 1,200 dollars, and the 
balance, excluding interest, at the time of default was 850 dollars. 
If deficiencies were prohibited only where the original obligation 
was 1,000 dollars or less, the creditor would be allowed to collect 
this deficiency. However, if deficiencies were prohibited where the 
obligation at the time of default was 1,000 dollars or less, no defi-
ciency would be allowed. 
The banks were extremely unhappy that the cutoff under Origi-
nal A.B. 1057 was based on the outstanding obligation at the time 
of default. All consumer accounts could fall within the provision, 
and on large accounts the creditor would not know whether he 
would be put to an election until the time of default. In addition, 
the banks vigorously insisted that the 2,000-dollar cutoff be reduced. 
They argued that forcing an election on accounts of that size went 
far beyond what was needed in light of the evil to be remedied. 
Moreover, and more important to the outcome of the negotiations, 
they took the position that too many of their accounts would be 
affected and that a reduction was essential if they were to support 
the bill. 
Consumer representatives, on the other hand, disliked the pros-
pect of reducing the cutoff size; yet, for practical reasons, they were 
willing to accede. However, they insisted on basing the cutoff on the 
balance at the time of default, as provided in the original bill. One 
of the most severe consumer criticisms of the DCCC had been its 
use of the original obligation size as the point of reference. Since the 
247. See NAnONAI. CONSUMER Ac::r § 5.211, Comment 1. 
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seller and the creditor can combine ,to control the cash price, the 
trade-in allowance, and finance and other charges,248 consumer rep-
resentatives felt that the availability of a deficiency gave creditors 
too much control. Further, the banks' complaints about the uncer-
tainty created by the provision did not convince the consumer 
representatives. 
At the end of first-stage negotiations, a compromise was achieved, 
based, not on rational calculation, but on political necessity. The 
obligation-size cutoff was reduced to 1,500 dollars, and the basis for 
its determination remained the size of the obligation at the time of 
default. In addition, consumer representatives willingly agreed to 
add a provision making the customer liable in damages for wrong-
fully damaging or hiding the collateral.249 
Second-stage negotiations yielded no change. However, this was 
one area in which the automobile finance companies influenced the 
WCA. On the floor of the Wisconsin senate they pushed through 
an amendment, which further reduced the obligation-size cutoff from 
1,500 dollars to 1,000 dollars.250 The members of the consumer-
credit coalition had agreed to stand behind the negotiated bill and 
oppose all amendments regardless of their individual interests. This 
was the only proposed amendment that they could not stop. One of 
the negotiators told me that he thought that the senate was simply 
"itching" to approve at least one amendment, and this turned out 
to be it.251 
If Professor Shuchman's data are typical of Wisconsin, the WCA 
will prohibit deficiencies on only thirty-eight per cent of the repos-
sessions, and the average deficiency on these will be about two thirds 
of the over-all average deficiency.252 Hence, Wisconsin creditors will 
lose only about twenty-five per cent of their pre-WCA deficiency 
recovery. The rough loss estimation of ninety dollars per reposses-
sion cited above for the entire denial of deficiencies then becomes 
twenty-two dollars. 
In contrast to the WCA, both the UCCC and the UCCC Redraft 
eliminate deficiencies where the original cash price of the goods 
248. See Shuchman, supra note 228, at 47. 
249. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.209(5). 
250. The amendment as proposed would also have changed the cutoff basis to the 
initial sale price. However, this was averted by a last minute amendment to the 
amendment offered by one of the coalition members. 
251. Conversation with John Holbrook, Milwaukee, February 1973. 
252. Assuming that repossession costs in the cases studied by Shuchman were 100 
dollars per car, the WCA would have denied deficiencies on 32 of the 83 claims 
studied. See Shuchman, supra note 228, at 62-65; Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.209(2), 
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repossessed is 1,000 dollars or less.258 This provision will, of course, 
preclude deficiencies in far fewer repossessions254 than the WCA and 
will also allow the creditor to determine the availability of a defi-
ciency in many cases. The intent of the UCCC Special Committee 
is apparently to protect debtors only in those cases in which the 
value of the collateral at the time of default is quite small and not to 
shift much of the burden of depreciation to the creditor. 255 
The National Commission, on the other hand, had no qualms 
about shifting this burden to the creditor. The Commission recom-
mends eliminating deficiencies where the purchase, in sales, or the 
amount financed, in loans, is 1,765 dollars or less.256 Despite the 
probability that such a restriction will increase rates and reduce 
credit availability, the Commission believes that "implementation 
of that recommendation would afford consumers protection in areas 
particularly susceptible of abuse," that is, in repossessions of house-
hold goods and used cars.267 
Regarding household goods, the Commission simply believes 
that too great a personal hardship would be caused if the creditor 
is allowed both the collateral and the deficiency.258 Although this 
does not seem to me to be a clear abuse, at least where the costs 
assessed are reasonable and a fair price is obtained for the collateral, 
the Commission believes that the burden created by the inevitably 
poor resale value of household goods ought to be spread throughout 
the community. I agree, chiefly because repossessions of household 
goods are rare and the impact of the limitation should be slight. 
253. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(2); UNIFORM CONSUll!ER CREDIT 
CODE § 5.103(2) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). The Redraft changes the cutoff 
basis from "cash price" to "cash sale price." However, the impact of this change 
should not be great since there is no separate definition for "cash sale price," and 
the definition of "cash price" remains substantially the same. Compare UNIFORM 
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.110 with UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CoDE § 1.301 (Work-
ing Redraft No. 4, 1972). In an earlier draft, the UCCC based the cutoff on the 
amount financed. UNIFORM CONSUll!ER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(1) (Working Draft No. 6, 
1967). This would have precluded deficiencies in more transactions than the present 
sale price formulation with which the Special Committee appears content. A still earlier 
draft, however, drew the line where the obligation at the time of repossession was 
500 dollars or less, which would probably have permitted more deficiencies but would 
have eliminated creditor control. See Jordan &: '\Varren, A Proposed Uniform Code 
for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. &: COMM. L. REv. 441, 457-58 (1967). 
254. Of the eighty-three cases studied by Professor Shuchman, deficiencies would 
have been prohibited in thirteen under the UCCC. Shuchman, supra note 228, at 62-65. 
255. See Jordan &: Warren, supra note 46, at 441 (emphasizing situations in which 
costs eat up the value of the collateral); Moo, supra note 15, at 452 (emphasizing the 
use of the threat of repossessing low-value collateral to coerce payment). 
256. COMMISSION R.El>ORT, supra note 23, at 29. 
257. Id. at 30. 
258. Id. at 31. 
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The Commission arrived at the figure of 1,765 dollars by identi• 
fying the point at which the used- and new-car markets are not in 
competition. Using a study of deficiencies in Washington, D.C., the 
Commission found abuses "peculiar to the used car market,''2uo and 
calculated the cutoff figure accordingly. Since, at this ·writing, the 
studies underlying the Commission Report are not available, it is 
difficult to evaluate this conclusion. 
2. Calculation of Deficiencies 
The scuttlebutt has long been that repossessed cars are often sold 
for less than they appear to be worth. The reason, it is said, is that 
"repossessed cars are usually of below-average quality because a con-
sumer is not motivated to invest in the maintenance of an asset he 
may shortly lose," and there is occasional "spite damage."280 Profes-
sor Shuchman's study indicates that repossessed cars are indeed 
usually sold at prices well below their apparent wholesale value, but 
not because they are worth less than wholesale.281 He suggests, 
rather, that the low return on repossessed cars results from the 
economics of the present system, which provide "no incentive for 
the financer and little incentive for the dealer to resell the repossessed 
car at the highest price obtainable."262 Rather, a pervasive system of 
backscratching exists among the majority of the automobile sales 
financers and dealers.263 Clearly, to the extent consumers pay in de-
ficiencies the differential between their cars' actual value and the 
resale price, the automobile sale-finance community receives added 
income. Equally clearly, those funds belong in consumer pockets. 
In response to this problem, Original A.B. 1057 provided that the 
computation of the deficiency was to be based on the fair market 
value at the time of sale rather than the actual sale price of the 
259. Id. at 30,31. 
260. Johnson, supra note 122, at 15. 
261, Shuchman used the Redbook, published by the National Automotive Pub-
lishers, to estimate the true value of repossessed cars. The Redbook is generally relied 
upon for accurate retail and wholesale automobile prices. See Shuchman, supra note 
228, at 27 n.28. His data showed that the price of the first resale of repossessed cars 
(from creditor to retailer) averaged only 71 per cent of Redbook wholesale. By com-
parison, where dealers buy and sell at weekly wholesale auctions, he found that the 
average price is 93 per cent of Redbook wholesale. However, since the second resale 
of repossessed cars (dealer to consumer) averaged 92 per cent of Redbook retail, the 
extremely low first resale price cannot be attributed to the cars' poor condition. In 
addition, examination of about 20 repossessed cars revealed that all could be driven 
and all appeared in normal condition. Only two out of 150 cars were "junked" after 
repossession. Id. at 31-33. 
262. Id. at 26. 
263. Id. at 37-38. 
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collateral; published trade estimates of retail values were presumed 
to be fair market value.264 The banks were willing to accept the 
elimination of the actual-sale-price doctrine but strongly objected to 
the presumption of retail value. They argued that since they are not 
in the business of selling automobiles, they could never dispose of 
automobiles at that price. Nevertheless~ consumer representatives 
held fast. The bill submitted to the legislature retained the presump-
tion. However, the presumption did not survive. The legislature ac-
cepted an amendment that deleted it. Thus, the dete:rmination of 
fair market value is left entirely to the Wisconsin courts.265 
Surely it is unrealistic to expect creditors to become retail auto-
mobile sellers, but it does seem entirely reasonable to expect the 
creditor to obtain a price comparable to the wholesale auction price. 
Professor Shuchman's data show that at the time of repossession the 
average Redhook retail value is 108 per cent .of the average net total 
claim, and the average Redhook wholesale value is 77 per cent of 
the average claim.266 To calculate deficiencies based on Redhook 
retail figures would be tantamount, on the average, to denying 
a deficiency. Since the car is probably worth only 77 per cent of the 
claim to the creditor, a rule using retail value actually places the 
entire burden of motor vehicle depreciation on the creditor. It 
seems to me that, where this is the desired result, the legislature 
ought to disclose its purpose. The burden should be given to the 
creditor either in the form of a complete denial of deficiencies or not 
at all. Where deficiencies are available, the creditor should have to 
deduct only the price he can reasonably expect to obtain-the fair 
market wholesale value of the goods. 
Unlike the WCA, the National Commission does not recommend 
a method of calculating deficiencies. Presumably, the Commission 
would solve the problem, at least in the used car market, by simply 
denying deficiencies altogether. However, a great number of cars 
are sold for prices in excess of 1,765 dollars, and I see no reason why, 
when these cars are repossessed, .consumers should receive credit for 
less than fair market wholesale value. 
3. Special Treatment for Loans 
The deficiency restrictions in Original A.B. 1057 applied to all 
consumer-credit transactions,267 whereas the UCCC restrictions ap-
264. A.B. 1057, § 425.212. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Am: § 5.212. 
265. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.210. 
266. Shuchman, supra note 228, at 32-33. 
267. A.B. 1057, § 425.212. See NATIONAL CONSUMER Aar: § 5.212. 
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ply only to credit sales.268 While the UCCC Redraft includes inter-
locking loans269 in its restrictions,270 the UCCC Special Committee 
otherwise adheres to its initial decision not to restrict deficiencies on 
loans. The National Commission, however, recommends only a 
minor distinction between sales and loans on the deficiency issue.211 
Although I have found no published explanation of the ration-
ales underlying these widely variant approaches, it is evident that 
the solution again turns on one's perception of the problem. 
Examples of the potential oppressiveness of deficiencies always seem 
to involve the purchase of an item that is later repossessed. In con-
trast, when a direct lender forecloses on his nonpurchase-money 
~ecurity interest in all the debtor's home furnishings in order to re-
duce the debt by twenty-five dollars it is usually seen as an abusive 
taking of a security interest, rather than as a deficiency problem.212 
hguably, then, it makes some sense to restrict deficiencies only in 
credit sales. Further, since a lender is generally permitted to take as 
much security as the debtor is willing to put up,213 restricting de-
ficiencies in loans would simply encourage, to the extent it is 
available, the taking of more security than the lender would or-
dinarily require-hardly a desirable result from the consumer view-
point. 
,On the other hand, if the debtor is to be relieved of the burden 
of the depreciation of consumer goods, whether they be cars, house-
hold items, or other goods, why should the mechanism by which 
credit is extended be relevant? Though the direct lender is not as 
involved in the sale as the indirect lender or the seller, the customer 
, is no less disillusioned when the direct lender repossesses than when 
the seller does. Further, if the object of restricting deficiencies is to 
remedy the problem of the less-than-actual-value sale, it is not 
realistic to expect a bank, which may engage in both direct and in-
268. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(1), 
269. For a discussion of the alternative definitions of "interlocking loans," see text 
accompanying notes 70-103 supra. 
270. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§ 5.103(1) (Working Redraft No. 4, 19i2), 
271. CoMMISSioN REPORT, supra note 23, at 29. Slightly different treatment is recom• 
mended in the definition of the deficiency cutoff basis. For loans, no deficiency would 
be permitted if the amount financed is 1,765 dollars or less, whereas on credit sales, an 
original sales price of 1,765 dollars or less precludes a deficiency. If the customer makes 
a sufficiently large down payment in a credit sale of goods in e.xcess of 1,765 dollars, 
the seller could escape these restrictions while extending credit in an amount less than 
1,765 dollars. Consequently, deficiencies in consumer loan cases are somewhat more 
severely restricted than are those in credit sales. 
272. See text accompanying notes 222-24 supra. 
273. See text between notes 221-22 supra. 
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direct financing, to dispose of one repossessed good any differently 
from another merely on the basis of the way in which its purchase 
was financed.274 
In Wisconsin, the issue was first raised by the banks. It had been 
their practice to make debt consolidation loans, some portion of 
which was normally secured. However, debtors who need these loans 
rarely own sufficient property to cover the entire loan. Conse-
quently, they actually are made partly in reliance on collateral and 
partly in reliance on the debtor's creditworthiness. Bank representa-
tives argued that such loans are beneficial to consumers and that 
their availability would be curtailed by the elimination of deficien-
cies with regard to them. 
Very basically, consumer representatives believed that, since the 
majority of deficiencies go uncollected, very little consumer credit, 
except for cars, is truly collateral-based. They were largely uncon-
vinced by creditor projections of decreased credit-availability. There-
fore, as of the end of the first-stage negotiations, they were unwilling 
to create any exception for loans. But the banks were not ready to 
give up. 
At the second stage, the consumer finance companies, the ma-
jority of whose business is direct loans, were greatly concerned by the 
prospect of loan restrictions resulting from abuses normally thought 
to arise out of credit sales. They vehemently insisted that consumer 
representatives identify their exact objectives in limiting deficiencies. 
Consumer representatives conceded that their primary concern-
that is, the most glaring area of abuse-was the sale of repossessed 
collateral at a price below its actual value, especially when the sale 
is between financers and retailers who have a continuing arrange-
ment. Finance company representatives argued that such practices 
did not occur in the loan industry; in the rare circumstance where 
finance companies repossess they have every reason to seek the max-
imum price for the collateral. Restricting deficiencies on loans would 
only force finance companies to be more conservative in their lend-
ing policies with no correlative benefit to the consumer. 
Under the combined pressure exerted by the banks and the fi-
nance companies, and in light of what they saw as their primary 
objectives, consumer representatives agreed, out of political necessity, 
to exempt noninterlocking loans from the WCA deficiency restric-
tions.275 
274. Of course, as suggested above, this problem can be largely overcome by cal-
culating deficiencies using fair market wholesale value. 
275. See Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.209(1). 
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This decision was clearly dictated by the political realities of the 
situation. Thus, there is no reason to expect it to be judicious, which, 
in my opinion, it is not. I agree that there is good reason for afford-
ing special treatment to some loans, but if deficiencies are to be re-
stricted in credit sales, only the exemption of nonpurchase-money 
loans makes any sense. The fact that the direct lender, in making a 
purchase-money loan, may be less closely tied to the sale than the 
indirect lender does not seem to be significant. The rationale for 
restricting deficiencies is not that the lender is somehow culpable, 
but, simply as a matter of policy, that he seems better able to bear the 
burden of depreciation. In that respect the purchase-money lender 
and the sales financer are identical. 
In comparison, nonpurchase-money collateral loans seem quite 
different. Where the debtor borrows against collateral he already 
owns, there is none of the rapid depreciation normally attendant to 
signing on the dotted line. The debtor is more likely to see the value 
of the collateral as being the amount that he could sell it for-which 
is always the creditor viewpoint-than the amount he paid for it~ 
which, I suspect, is the debtor's view at the time of purchase. On 
repossession there is no burden of substantial depreciation to be 
allocated, and the amount of the deficiency does not appear un-
reasonably large.276 In my opinion, special treatment of nonpur-
chase-money loans is perfectly rational,277 and probably advisable. 
Otherwise, the decreased availability of such collateralized loans 
is likely to be balanced by only minimal consumer benefit. 
There is at least one notable problem in prohibiting deficiencies 
only on purchase-money loans. It is common for lenders to make 
multipurpose loans where the proceeds are used partly to purchase 
goods and partly to consolidate prior debts, pay taxes, or finance a 
vacation. It is thus necessary to devise a scheme that denies a de-
ficiency only with regard to the portion of the loan that went toward 
the purchase. Although some difficulty is unavoidable, the problem 
is not insurmountable. 
While many satisfactory schemes might be devised, one method 
of allocation is to treat this situation in the way that security in-
276. As suggested above, this apparent unreasonableness is the core of the deficiency 
problem. Another factor vitiating the debtor's disillusionment is that, whereas in a 
credit sale the debtor receives goods on credit, in a nonpurchase-money loan, ltc 
receives money on credit. Consequently, in a loan transaction, the debtor is more likely 
to know that the creditor expects the debt to be repaid and that giving up the col• 
lateral may not be sufficient. 
277. The Wisconsin banks were chiefly concerned about debt-consolidation loans. 
Naturally, when consumer representatives agreed to exclude loans completely, the 
banks were delighted. 
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terests in add-on sales are tteated.278 For example, where a portion 
of the proceeds from a multipurpose loan is used to purchase goods 
in which a security interest is taken, the payments on the obligation 
would be deemed to be first applied to pay off that portion of the 
loan.279 If the goods are repossessed before that portion is deemed to 
be paid off and, in keeping with the WCA formulation, if the out-
standing balance on that portion is 1,000 dollars or less, the entire 
obligation is reduced by the amount of that balance. That is, the 
creditor forfeits the difference between the balance on the purchase-
money portion of the loan and the sale price of the repossessed col-
lateral. This method treats the loan as two separate loans-one 
purchase-money loan and one nonpurchase-money loan. It would 
also be necessary to prohibit foreclosure on any nonpurchase-money 
security interests in satisfaction of the purchase-money part of the 
debt. To the extent that proceeds of the sale of such collateral ex-
ceeded the nonpurchase-money portion of the obligation, a rebate 
would be due the customer. 
A final bothersome point with this method of allocation is the 
treatment of the security interest in goods that are deemed to be paid 
off. Termination of the security interest will disappoint the creditor, 
who is accustomed to relying on the security for the duration of the 
entire loan. Further, he could eliminate the problem by advancing 
the purchase money on Monday and then advancing the remainder 
on Wednesday, taking a second, nonpurchase-money security in-
terest in the newly purchased item. Presumably, paying off the 
purchase-money loan would have no effect on the second security 
interest. Such loan-splitting gyrations should not be encouraged.280 
Accordingly, I would be inclined, in keeping with the WCA 
restrictions on security interests,281 to provide for the termination 
278. See text accompanying notes 212-13 supra. 
279, Of course, it would be possible, as suggested by Professor Kripke, to deem 
payments to be applied to tbis portion of the debt ratably in the ratio that this portion 
bears to the entire obligation. K.ripke, supra note 46, at 474-75. This would work to 
the detriment of the creditor in that the possibility of being forced to an election 
would exist through the entire term of the loan. However, if the security interest in 
the goods terminates as that portion of the loan is deemed to be paid off, such a 
payment allocation would work to the detriment of the customer since the security 
interest would not terminate until the entire obligation was paid. 
280. Because of the split rate provisions (18 per cent on the first 500 dollars, 12 per 
cent on the excess), the WCA explicitly prohibits loan splitting for the purpose of 
obtaining a higher rate. Wisconsin Consumer Act§ 422.414. The creditor could avoid a 
violation here by charging only 12 per cent on the second loan. Clearly, however, 
encouraging the creditor to double his paperwork serves only to increase complexity 
and costs. 
281, See text accompanying notes 222-23 supra. 
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when deemed paid of security interests in those household necessi-
ties in which no nonpurchase-money security interest can be taken 
and to allow the continuation of security interests in other property. 
Consequently, if the property is the type in which a nonpurchase-
money security interest may be taken, an election to repossess would 
be required only until the property is deemed paid for, whereupon 
the property remains available as security for the rionpurchase-money 
portion of the loan. 
4. Voluntary Surrender 
Original A.B. 1057 provided, notwithstanding any waiver by the 
creditor of his security interest, that the customer had the right at 
any time voluntarily to surrender the collateral to the creditor, the 
effect of such surrender being the equivalent of repossession.282 The 
creditor would thus be denied a deficiency if the outstanding balance 
at the time of surrender was below the deficiency cutoff point. This, 
in effect, gave the customer the power to make the creditor's election 
for him.283 The Wisconsin consumer representatives never intended 
to force creditors into such a clearly inequitable position and they 
agreed willingly to redraft the section. 
Those who did the redrafting intended the provisions on en-
forcement of security interests to work generally as follows: The 
creditor would always be free to request the collateral. Having made 
his election, upon the return of the collateral the limitations on de-
ficiencies would apply. However, if the customer surrendered with 
neither solicitation nor suggestion by the secured party-that is, if 
there was a so-called "voluntary surrender"-no deficiency limita-
tions would apply.284 In effect, the provisions were intended to give 
the customer the right to avail himself of the creditor's means for 
disposition of collateral, while leaving the election between the debt 
and the collateral to the creditor. Although the draftsmen may not 
have achieved this objective,285 their reasoning was sound, and their 
objective, I think, correct. · 
282. A.B. 1057, § 425.205. See NATIONAL CONSUMER. Ac:r § 5.205. 
283. See Moo, supra note 15, at 453. 
284. Holbrook &: Bugge, Creditor's Responsibilities and Duties Under the WCA, 
46 Wis. BAR BuL., Feb. 1973, at 37, 45. 
285. Defining in terms of objective behavior the point at which the creditor has 
made the subjective election to resort to collateral proved quite difficult. The result 
was the following: "The surrender of collateral by a customer is not a voluntary 
surrender if it is made pursuant to a request or demand by the [creditor] for the sur• 
render of the collateral, or if it is made pursuant to a threat, statement or notice by 
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The Commission Report does not touch upon the treatment of 
surrender; the UCCC and the UCCC Redraft take a different tack. 
By denying deficiencies only where the creditor repossesses or "vol-
untarily accepts surrender,"286 the UCCC presumably allows a 
creditor to avoid a forced election by refusing to accept suriender.287 
Hence, under the UCCC the debtor cannot avail himself of the 
creditor's means of disposing of collateral. Although this does not 
appear to be a critical difference, the Wisconsin approach seems 
preferable. Occasionally an overburdened customer simply deposits 
the collateral on the creditor's doorstep. In such cases, the creditor 
should be encouraged to dispose of the collateral without having to 
refuse surrender in order to avoid losing his right to a deficiency. 
IV. SUMMARY: WHAT HAPPENED IN WISCONSIN AND WHAT 
DoES lT MEAN FOR THE REST OF THE COUNTRY? 
We have seen, in the context of some specific issu~s, t;he manner 
in which the negotiation and drafting of the WCA proceeded and the 
results of those efforts. We may now look more closely at the various 
factors that contributed to the creation of the WCA. An understand-
ing of these factors may be helpful in predicting what to ,expect in 
other states. 
I\ 
the [creditor] that the [creditor] intends to take possession of the collateral." Wisconsin 
Consumer Act § 425.204(3). . . 
Unfortunately, the "request or demand" formulation leaves open the question of 
what happens where the creditor simply notifies the debtor of his right to surrender. 
However, the administrator has cleared up ~is uncertainty. The creditor may ,notify 
the debtor of his right voluntarily to surrender without fear that such notification will 
amount to an election. WIS • .ADMIN. CODE, BANKING § 80.69' (1973). ' 
To add to the initial uncertainty, the automobile-finance-company-sponsored amend-
ment, which reduced the deficiency cutoff point to 1,000 dollars, see text accompanying 
note 251 supra, was very poorly drafted. It left Wisconsin Consumer Act § 425.209(2) 
to read that the customer is not liable for the deficiency "[i]f the merchant repossesses 
or accepts voluntary surrender ••.• " This was certainly not the intent of anybody, 
including the sponsors of the amendment. The result is this: Where a customer volun-
tarily surrenders, section 425.209(2) eliminates customer liability, for the deficiency and 
section 425.204(2) makes the customer liable for the deficiency. To add to the confusion, 
the "accepts voluntary surrender" language of section 425.209(2) implies that a creditor 
may refuse to accept voluntary surrender, whereas section. 425.204(2) guarantees the 
customer the right so to surrender collateral. Clearly, the Wisconsin legislature hllS, its 
work cut out. '· 
286. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(2); UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 
§§ 5.103(2)-(4) (Working Redraft No. 4, 1972). Perhaps the draftsmen of the amendment 
discussed in note 285 supra intended to use this UCCC language. If so, the seemingly 
innocent transposition of ·"voluntarily accepts surrender" to "accepts voluntary sur-
render" caused a surprising amount of excitement and confusion. See note 285 supra. 
287. The MCCA appears to have adopted this approach. The consumer is permitted 
to "offer to voluntarily surrender" the collateral, and the creditor is precluded from 
seeking judgment on the obligation if he "elects to accept the surrender." MODEL 
CONSUllmR CREDIT Ac:r § 7.203(1). 
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A. Significant Factors Influencing the Creation of the WCA 
Recall the setting in which the WCA came into being. In the 
summer of 1971, the Wisconsin banks, retail merchants, and con-
sumer . finance companies were all working toward the passage of 
special interest legislation. At the time, Original A.B. I 057 was 
sitting in the Wisconsin legislature with little likelihood of passage. 
By March 1972, the WCA had been negotiated, drafted, and 
pt!Ssed. The critical factors were (1) the initial decision on the part of 
consumer forces to stop opposing rate increases in exchange for 
comprehensive consumer protection, (2) the forthright action taken 
by Governor Lucey, (3) the split in the credit community, (4) the 
unquestioned authority of the consumer negotiators to represent all 
consumer groups, (5) the personalities of the parties, (6) the fact that 
the framework of the negotiations was Original A.B. 1057, (7) the 
information upon which negotiators based their decisions, (8) the 
disparity in the resources available to consumer and creditor repre-
sentatives, and (9) the nonparticipation of the automobile finance 
companies. 
I. The Decision To Trade Rate Increases for Other Benefits 
The paramount policy decision made by consumer advocates in 
entering into a coalition with creditors was that allowing increases in 
interest rates would be a worthwhile exchange for comprehet1sive 
consumer-credit protection. This decision, in my opinion, can 
neither be criticized nor applauded with any certainty because it 
requires the answer to an unanswerable question: To what extent 
should the paying consumer subsidize the protection of the nonpay-
ing consumer? The consumer who has a secure source of income, 
maintains a sensible amount of debt, makes his payments on time, 
and never has tremble qualifying for credit is not greatly in need 0£ 
protection. Granted, some of the protections of the WCA, such as 
disclosure requirements, the elimination of financer immunity :from 
claims against sellers, regulation of consumer-approval transactions, 
and advertising restrictions, aid all consumers. However, most of the 
protections of the WCA, especially those with the greatest potential 
cost impact, apply to the consumer who has trouble meeting his 
payments. To the extent that his rates are increased, the paying 
consumer is bearing the cost of protections primarily intended for 
the benefit of others, 
While the over-all question is indeed unanswerable, I think that 
at least a partial answer may be attempted: Regardles5 of the cost im• 
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pact, no creditor should be allowed to engage in practices that are 
patently unfair and oppressive. For example, even though the pro-
hibition will increase costs (or reduce profits), no creditor should be 
allowed to sell repossessed collateral for less than its actual value 
and then pursue a deficiency on the basis of the sale price. Further 
examples of such egregious abuses are false advertising and op-
pressive collection practices. Beyond these fairly obvious instances, 
however, certainty evaporates. 
Nevertheless, the decision in Wisconsin was not a difficult one 
for consumers because rate increases in Wisconsin were, in my opin-
ion, inevitable. If national averages can be validly compared, 1971 
rates in Wisconsin were low. At the twelve per cent rate, the profit-
ability of bank and retailer revolving-credit plans was marginal, and 
these groups were moving quickly for relief. Moreover, the finance 
companies had already convinced the legislature that they needed an 
increase. It seems doubtful that consumers would have been able to 
resist these forces permanently. By allowing the inevitable to occur, 
consumer forces were able to obtain comprehensive protection at a 
very small cost. Of course, i£ consumer forces had staunchly opposed 
the creditor legislation, the rates might have increased to only 
fifteen, rather than eighteen, per cent. However, the decision made 
in Wisconsin can hardly be criticized on the basis of such specula-
tion. 
2. The Role of the Governor 
Probably none of the factors influencing the creation of the 
WCA was more significant than the timely action of Wisconsin 
Governor Patrick J. Lucey. Prior to his decision to veto piecemeal, 
creditor-sponsored legislation, the consumer-finance company rate in-
crease bill had nearly passed the legislature without its two-year time 
limitation. In addition, there were no foreseeable obstacles in the 
path of the bank and retailer legislation. By taking the position that 
he did, Governor Lucey forced the creditors to choose between do-
ing without legislation they desired or accepting comprehensive 
legislation. In addition, by instructing the legislature to take up 
A.B. 1057, Governor Lucey greatly reduced any possibility that the 
comprehensive legislation would be based on the UCCC. By clearly 
placing his confidence in the proponents of A.B. 1057, the Governor, 
in substance, vested these individuals with the authority to speak 
for all consumer groups. Since each of these was a critical factor, the 
Governor had a tremendous impact on both the formation of the 
consumer-creditor coalition and on the direction of the negotiations. 
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3. The Split in the Credit Community 
The position taken by the Governor set the stage for the split in 
the credit community. Only the banks, retailers, and consumer 
finance companies stood to gain by supporting comprehensive legis-
lation. However, while they were certainly in an uncomfortable 
position, they were not helpless. Since consumers needed creditor 
support to obtain passage of comprehensive legislation, these credi-
tors could certainly have forced a stalemate. Assuming that sympathy 
for consumer interests was not rapidly on the increase in the legis-
lature, time was on the side of the creditors. The only creditors who 
were under any serious time pressure were the large retailers, pri-
marily because of the possibility of continued liability for usury 
violations and the adverse publicity arising out of the Penney 'case. 
The banks and finance companies could probably have afforded to 
wait for rate increases. It seems to me, then, that if the entire credit 
community had refused to work within the framework of A.B. 1057, 
and if they offered to negotiate at least some substantial changes in 
Wisconsin law, the Governor might eventually have backed down to 
some extent. Creditor solidarity in Wisconsin could then have re-
sulted in far weaker legislation. 
The responsibility for the split, it seems to me, rests almost wholly 
with the banks. The national retailers are not nearly as influential in 
the Wisconsin credit community as are the Wisconsin banks. Al-
though the support of the retailers at first-stage negotiations was 
helpful, the participation of the banks was the critical element. 
Why did the Wisconsin banks participate? Certainly their in• 
terest in a rate increase was central to their decision. An additional 
factor, however, should not be underemphasized: The banks were 
not intimidated by the prospect of comprehensive consumer-credit 
legislation. They had the foresight to know that such legislation was, 
to some extent, inevitable and that the legitimate creditor has noth-
ing to fear from such legislation if it is sensibly drafted and re-
sponsive to the interests of all affected groups. If agreement on 
sensible legislation could be reached, the banks saw that it would be 
the most direct route to the legislation they desired. Hence, they took 
the position that, if the proponents of Original A.B. 1057 were wil-
ling to negotiate substantial modifications in the bill, they would 
be willing to give their support. 
Soon after the banks had begun serious negotiations with con-
sumer representatives, the representatives of the retail merchants 
joined the discussions, and the first-stage coalition was formed. By 
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the end of first-stage negotiations, many of the most severe bank and 
retailer objections to Original A.B. 1057 had been resolved, and 
the negotiators had become confident that most of their remaining 
differences could be ironed out. With such influential creditors 
backing the bill, a number of other creditors, such as the credit 
unions, the savings and loan associations, and the farm-implement 
dealers, joined the bandwagon. Whereas six months previously it 
had appeared that these creditors would gain nothing by supporting 
A.B. 1057, the staunch support of the banks and retailers had changed 
matters considerably. Since A.B. 1057 now appeared to have a good 
chance of passage, new groups were willing to trade their support of 
the bill for concessions in their specific areas of interest. 
From the standpoint of the coalition's strength, the most impor-
tant creditor group to enter the second-stage negotiations was the 
consumer finance companies. While they were confident that with 
the help of the automobile finance companies they could block pas-
sage of the WCA, they realized that such action would make it 
difficult to obtain legislative approval for increases in interest rates. 
Moreover, many reputable consumer finance companies desired 
comprehensive legislation. They felt that many abuses in the con-
sumer-credit field were unjustly attributed to the substantial con-
sumer finance companies; supporting comprehensive reform could 
only enhance their reputation. Many consumer finance companies 
also saw consumer-credit reform as inevitable but believed that 
piecemeal legislation might suffer from overkill. Sensible compre-
hensive legislation seemed a better alternative. 
Accordingly, the consumer finance companies supported the 
adoption of some form of the UCCC in Wisconsin. They held fast 
to this position until January 1972, primarily because of doubts 
that negotiations with the proponents of A.B. 1057 would be fruit-
ful. Having seen the significant results of first-stage negotiations, 
most consumer credit companies joined the negotiations.288 
4. The Unquestioned Authority of the Consumer 
Representatives 
A common legislative problem in dealing with consumer rep-
resentatives is that there are normally quite a few of them, each with 
his own ideas as to what consumers want. There was no such con-
fusion in Wisconsin. Governor Lucey had, in substance, told credi-
288. Household Finance Corporation had long been a staunch supporter of national 
adoption of the UCCC. Hence, it opposed the WCA to the end. See note 45 supra. 
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tors that if they could come to terms with the proponents of A.B. 
1057, he would support the result. Given this strong backing, the 
proponents of A.B. 1057 were in a position to be able to deliver the 
support of nearly all consumer groups. Rarely do consumer repre-
sentatives have this kind of unquestioned authority. It was, in my 
opinion, critical both to the creditors' willingness to enter the coali-
tion and to the consumer representatives' ability to negotiate effec-
tively. 
5. Personalities 
As is probably always the case in such situations, personalities 
played an important role in the formation of the consumer-creditor 
coalition, especially at the very beginning of first-stage negotiations. 
All parties to the first-stage negotiations approached the negotiations 
with caution. Although the banks were in an uncomfortable posi-
tion, they did not regard the prospect of continuing without a rate 
increase to be a total disaster. Hence, they were not to be pressured 
into supporting legislation, such as Original A.B. 1057, that would 
severely prejudice their interests, While the retailers may have felt 
a little more pressure than the banks, primarily because of their po• 
tential liability for usury violations, they too approached negotia• 
tions cautiously. Consumer representatives were similarly circum-
spect; they had no intention of supporting a watered-down package 
that did not substantially change existing Wisconsin law. Conse• 
quently, it was essential to the formation of any coalition that the 
representatives consider each other to be reasonable and sensitive 
to all legitimate interests. This is, of course, what happened. 
The creditor representatives willingly agreed that in many in-
stances consumers had suffered serious abuse and that in those cases 
sensibly drafted legislation was needed. Similarly, while consumer 
representatives felt that there was a great need for change, they 
hoped that change could be achieved through means that would have 
a minimal cost impact on the credit community; they were well 
aware that creditor costs would be passed on to the consumer to the 
extent possible. Although they shared the general objectives of the 
NCA, none of the Wisconsin consumer representatives had partici-
pated in the drafting of the NCA, so they were not personally com-
mitted to its specific provisions. They took the position that they 
would be willing to make sweeping changes if it could be rationally 
shmm that A.B. 1057 was unworkable as written or that their objec-
tives could be achieved through means more acceptable to the credit 
community. With the early development of mutual respect and the 
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mutual discovery that meaningful results were possible, senous 
first-stage negotiations began. 
6. Original A.B. 1057-the Framework for 
the Negotiations 
One of the most influential factors regarding the total content of 
the WCA is that the negotiations were based on Original A.B. 1057, 
rather than on the DCCC. As a result, the creditors were always in 
the position of arguing for change, and the consumer representatives 
were in the position of resisting change. Clearly, the consumer rep-
resentatives had inertia on their side. 
In addition, a negotiator has only a finite amount of influence, 
which is dissipated to some extent with every concession he receives. 
Hence, creditor representatives were forced to marshall their "in-
fluence points'' and expend them only on the matters most critical 
to their interests. The result was that many original provisions 
remained unchanged or only slightly changed, not because creditor 
representatives were unconcerned about them, but simply because 
creditors were more concerned with other matters. Probably the best 
example of this phenomenon is the WCA penalty structure. The 
W~A provides remedies and penalties in varying degrees for viola-
tions 0£ its provisions. In many cases, substantial penalties are im-
posed for what many creditors consider to be relatively harmless 
violations.289 Yet, due to the concern ·with other areas of the bill, 
creditor representatives never objected to the penalty structure. 
289. This is true, for example, of restrictions on debt collection practices. For 
example, Wisconsin Consumer Act § 407.104 provides: 
(1) In attempting to collect an alleged debt arising from a consumer credit trans-
action, a debt collector shall not: 
(f) D1sclose or threaten to disclose information concerning the existence of a 
debt known to be reasonably disputed by the customer without disclosing the 
fact that the customer disputes the debt; 
(i) Claitn, or attempt or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge or reason 
to know that the right does not exist; 
(l} Threaten action against the tustomer unless the action is taken in regular 
course or is intended with respect to the particular debt. 
Violation of this section sttbjects the creditor to the greater of (I) twice the finance 
charge involved in the transaction (but not less than 100 dollars or more than 1000 
dollars) or (2) actual damages sustained by the customer. Wisconsin Consumer Act 
§ 425.304. "Actual damages may include mental anguish with or without accompanying 
physical injury." Wisconsin Consumer Act § 427.105(1), See generally Holbrook &: 
Bugge, supra note 284, at 46. 
Similarly, the inclusion of an unenforceable confession 0£ judgment clause in a 
consumer contract renders the entire transaction void, and the customer is entitled to 
retain the proceeds of the transaction without obligation. Wisconsin Consumer Act 
§§ 422.405, 425.305. 
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While the fact that negotiations were based on Original A.B. 
1057 affected all creditors, its impact was greatest on those creditors 
with the least influence in the negotiations. Thus, while it probably 
did not severely affect the banks, its impact was undoubtedly felt 
by door-to-door sellers, independent furniture dealers, debt collec-
tors, and the automobile finance companies. 
7. How the Negotiators Made Their Decisions 
One factor that is probably critical to the outcome of any negoti-
ations is the manner in which negotiators determine what their cli-
ents want: When faced with a decision between two alternatives, 
how is the choice made? The creditor representative has no serious 
problem here. He knows his client well, his client's interests are 
normally clear, and he can consult with his client if the need arises. 
Representing consumers, however, is a far different matter. The 
client is unmanageably large, impossible to communicate with in 
any meaningful sense, and has widely varying, often contradictory, 
interests. 
The process through which the Wisconsin consumer represen-
tatives made their decisions was very similar to the procedure I have 
followed in analyzing their work product: They first tried to iden-
tify what the problem was, they thought about the alternative solu-
tions, and they made some substantial guesses. Of course, identifying 
the problem was the critical step. Here, the Wisconsin consumer 
representatives relied heavily on personal experience, obtained pri-
marily through work in legal aid clinics. Since reliable empirical 
information is rarely available, personal experience with the prob-
lems of the poor was probably as good a basis on which to rely as 
any. Moreover, since most of the provisions of the WCA are aimed 
at alleviating the problems of the poor, the Wisconsin consumer 
representatives were probably as well-equipped as anyone could be 
to identify accurately the problems most in need of attention. 
Regarding the problems of the middle class, however-and this 
includes the vast majority of automobile buyers-the Wisconsin 
consumer representatives had no particular expertise. In fact, con-
sidering the general dearth of empirical data in this area, no one 
may have the necessary expertise. At any rate, the Wisconsin consumer 
representatives were forced to make their choices on the basis of 
common sense, hearsay, and the scant empirical research of others. 
They were often forced to guess at answers to such questions as: 
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How many consumers ,;viii benefit from a right to cure? How many 
will benefit from notice and opportunity to object to repossession? 
In these areas I believe there is the greatest likelihood that the WCA 
has struck an improper balance. I should emphasize that I have no 
serious criticism of the choices made in Wisconsin: The answers 
are just as elusive to me as they were to the Wisconsin negotiators. 
However, the decisions made in this area were critical to the ulti-
mate shaping of the WCA. Consequently, since they were largely 
based on assumption, the impact of the WCA should qe monitored 
particularly closely in this area, and all parties should be open to 
change if the benefits turn out to be miniscule in light of increased 
costs. 
Creditors generally made their decisions on the basis of data 
from their own records. For example, in order to determine the pos-
sible impact of a particular deficiency cutoff point, creditors could 
look to their records to evaluate the prospective costs. The various 
alternatives could then be more rationally weighed. However, cred-
itors also did some guessing, especially as to what impact various 
provisions would have on the average customer's attitude toward 
debt. 
8. The Disparity in Resources 
Whereas creditor representatives generally had an unlimited 
source of manpower available to them, the resources of the Wiscon-
sin consumer representatives were very limited. On occasion, con-
sumer representatives simply were unable to amass the information 
necessary to present a satisfactory argument for their point of view 
and were forced to back down. For example, when negotiators were 
faced with a difficult policy issue, creditors would often base their 
arguments on self-generated data. The limited consumer resources 
made it impossible to evaluate carefully such statistics or to generate 
contrasting data. Therefore, the Wisconsin consumer representatives 
were probably not as effective as they might otherwise have been. 
9. The Nonparticipation of Automobile Finance 
Companies 
As I have suggested at some length,290 the nonparticipation of 
the automobile finance companies in the negotiations may have been 
290. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra. 
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a significant factor, for they almost certainly could have exacted at 
1east a few noteworthy consumer concessions in exchange for their 
support of the WCA. 
B. ·what the WCA Means for Other States 
The complex situation that occurred in Wisconsin is not likely 
to be duplicated in other states, so not all the factors critical to the 
creation of the WCA will be important elsewhere. Yet, there will 
undoubtedly be similarities between the problems facing consumers 
in other states and those that faced consumers in Wisconsin. For 
example, the passage of comprehensive consumer protection in near-
ly all states will presumably require at least some cooperation on the 
part of creditors. I doubt that in many state legislatures consumer 
sympathy runs so high that creditor forces can simply be over-
powered. 
A few basic lessons can be learned from the Wisconsin experi-
ence, some less surprising than others. First, unsurprisingly, a strong 
consumer political position is essential to the passage of far-reaching 
legislation. Second, and perhaps a little surprising to some, creditors 
are not monolithic. They have diverse, sometimes contradictory in-
terests; they have different attitudes toward change; and they make 
their own decisions. Hence, they can be split. Third, the experience 
of the automobile finance companies suggests that if comprehensive 
1egislation ultimately passes, those creditors who did not participate 
in itS design will probably have made a mistake. Fourth, the exis-
tence of realistic consumer leaders capable of delivering the support 
of most consumer groups is essential to effective cooperation between 
consumers and creditors. 
The political atmosphere in each state and the factors contrib-
uting to political influence generally are extremely diverse. It would 
hardly seem worthwhile to attempt here to predict the future of con-
sumer political influence in other states. To be sure, consumer con-
sciousness in the United States has increased significantly in the past 
few years. If this increase continues, sympathy for consumers in state 
legislatures is sure to follow. Yet, it is quite possible that awareness 
of consumer problems will prove to be a cyclical phenomenon and 
will soon begin to :wane. If so, the WCA may be the national high-
water mark in consumer-credit protection. In any event, it is not 
likely to have much significance for other states until consciousness 
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of const1mer needs reaches substantial proportions. Once cotlsumer 
forces within a particular state begin to gain strength, however, the 
WCA could and should in:fltience the legislative process in a number 
of ways. It may, :for instance, be the starting point for consumer-
creditor negotiations. Since the WCA arose out of negotiations in 
which the competing patties enjoyed substantially equal bargaining 
positions, it already represents a great deal of compromise by both 
sides. Moreover, even if negotiations in other states do Iiot begin 
with the WCA, it still provides an excellent reference. 
I£ consumer strength reaches the point where some change is 
imminent, the Wisconsin experience should soften creditor resistance 
to change. Many creditors fear that substantial change will have dis-
astrous effects. They fear that far-reaching legislation will not only 
complicate their operations, but also undermine the customer's atti-
tude toward debt. A creditor who envisions such a calamity, whether 
his fears are founded or unfounded, is not likely to support change. 
The broad creditor support ultimately enjoyed by the WCA shows 
that many Wisconsin creditors were eventually ~onvinced they could 
live with the WCA. Moreover, if after a few years under the WCA 
the Wisconsin consumer-credit community is alive and well, general 
creditor apprehension of impending doom should begin to subside. 
The WCA should soften creditor resistance to change in another 
way-through the example of what happened to the automobile 
finance companies. Once change is imminent, it is clearly to the ad-
vantage of the creditor to participate in the negotiations. No drafts-
man can be expected to foresee all the likely effects of a particular 
restriction. The realistic consumer representative wants to know, to 
the extent possible, how the proposed legislation will affect the cred-
itors in his state. 
Perhaps the WCA may influence the legislative process in other 
states most significantly by illustrating what can be accomplished by 
capable, open, and cohesive consumer forces. Even if consumer 
awareness runs high in the state, and ~ven if a few influential cred-
itors are willing to negotiate, meaningful results are not likely if 
consumer forces are fragmented or if consumer representatives do 
not realistically view the functional relationship between consumers 
and creditors. Consumer representatives must realize that what is 
bad for creditors is not necessarily good for consumers. No creditor 
will be willing to cooperate with consumer representatives who, as 
is often the case, do not understand this. Equally important, if not 
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more so, no creditor will be willing to cooperate with representatives 
of only a few of the consumer groups within the state. To expend a 
large amount of energy reaching an accord with one consumer rep-
resentative makes Jittle sense if the result is opposed by other con-
sumer groups. 
Accordingly, if the WCA induces consumer forces in other states 
to unite under capable leadership, it will indeed have a meaningful 
impact outside Wisconsin. 
